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ABSTRACT 
 The advancement of wireless medical devices in the hospital has created an 
environment that is unsustainable, unsustainable for security management. I will explain how 
the development of wireless medical devices has changed the landscape of security in the 
medical field. How the history of medical devices and organizational issues affected device 
development. I will look in to the inner workings of pacemakers and pacemaker 
programmers and how their systems affect security.  Who are the stakeholders for protecting 
the information and function of the medical device and pacemaker? What are the 
stakeholder’s capacities and obstacles, especially if the device is implanted in your body? 
Once we understand the risk and who has the best ability to mitigate it, how can a system of 
prioritization of medical devices be used to solve the issues of insecure medical devices 
and/or pacemakers.  How can the process of prioritization bring us back within our risk 
threshold for medical devices?  
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CHAPTER 1   
OVERVIEW 
 
We are currently witnessing the global evolution of computerized medical solutions 
and devices, from individualized, standalone solutions to highly integrated medical devices 
that are incorporating wireless communication, Internet connectivity, and cloud data storage. 
Doctors and patients are depending on these advances to more effectively treat everything 
from heart conditions and chronic ailments to disabilities. The advancements do not stop with 
medical patient solutions and personal medical devices.  Medical clinics are storing personal 
records and past medical histories on local and interconnected systems throughout “The 
Cloud” or, more accurately, the globe.  This thesis will explore how interconnected medical 
devices and services have changed the patient/doctor relationship. Who is responsible for 
protecting the information and function of the medical IT, especially the device implanted in 
your body? Is it you, the doctor who implanted it, the office or hospital where the procedure 
was done, or the manufacturer of the product or service? After deciding who has the best 
ability to secure medical devices I will address how to solve the situations using prioritization 
and security architecture.  These advancements can prolong and save lives and can have 
enormous positive benefits, but could also be the switch that turns you off. 
1.1 Contributions of My Research 
 When starting my research on security issues found in medical devices, it was clearly 
apparent that not much past research had been completed in this area. A lot of the current 
research focuses on the technical problems that are associated with individual devices and 
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security governance protocols that the FDA enacts for device manufactures to follow.  My 
contributions, to the security issues that are exploding in the medical device industry, take a 
different perspective of the problem.  The hope is that developing a systemic solution will 
have greater effect on the total problem instead of using the traditional way of trying to 
develop a technology that mitigates security issues one device at a time. 
  In chapters 1 through 5 my contributions center on developing a schematic of who 
the major stakeholders in the implantable medical device industry are and what capacities 
and obstacles they face.  It is important to understand what the strengths and weakness are in 
the industry before it can be calculated as to where the major weaknesses exist in security.  
Attending and speaking with medical and security professionals at closed think-tank’s, I was 
able to hone in on what was the most important need for medical device security in the eyes 
of pertinent stakeholders.  I compiled and utilized this information to help make an in-depth 
analysis that I could apply to existing research and draw relevant conclusions.   
 My next contribution was to look in-depth at the pacemaker and programmer units to 
locate possible security vulnerabilities. I was able to obtain and social engineer over 30,000 
dollars in top of the line medical equipment for under 200 dollars so I could attempt 
penetration test to find vulnerabilities.  Currently there is a lot of media on the ability to hack 
a pacemaker.  My research will show that hacking a pacemaker is difficult and unlikely, but 
compromising the programmer unit has a higher likelihood because I was able to find more 
security vulnerabilities.  
 Finally, in chapter 8, I took a business model and applied it to the security issues that 
hospitals have with prioritization of medical devices. This is an obvious problem I see 
hospitals grappling with after meeting on a team with several prominent institutions.  The 
business method makes it possible to solve security vulnerabilities with medical devices with 
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a method that allows for traceability and prioritization.   In this chapter I also strive to solve 
the issues with medical device security by developing traceability and prioritization using 
security architecture. This is vital to hospitals because they are currently struggling with the 
amount of new applications and devices that have wireless capabilities.  
 
1.2 History Literature Review 
 
It is important to look back at a brief history of a couple major medical devices to 
understand the complexity of security issues. There is a nexus between the advancement of 
the medical device market and past advancements in wireless technology. The medical 
device industry could learn from the experiences of the mobile device industry. Additionally, 
mobile devices are at the forefront evolving between the two categories of technology.  A 
brief history of insulin pumps and pacemakers will reveal their importance to the 
development of patient health.   
 Before the 1920s the diagnosis of diabetes meant a shorter life or death. Diabetes 
became a major issue because many people were having complications from the disease. 
Using insulin was an option for most diabetic patients, but it required a lot of work and 
complications were certain. The 1920s to the 1960s saw the diabetic patient as having a 
difficult life. In the early 1960s the first insulin pump was designed. Unfortunately, it was the 
size of a backpack and didn’t allow for mobility. Through the 60s insulin pumps advanced in 
technology and started to get smaller.  The start of the 1980s found insulin pumps developed 
to about the size of a deck of cards. The first insulin pump was implanted into a human on 
September 5th, 1980. Insulin pumps have advanced since the first implantation and have 
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become commonplace within the diabetic community. The pumps allow for diabetic patients 
to have more freedom and keep their glucose levels within acceptable ranges. 
  The United States has seen an alarming increase in the amount of diabetic cases. A 
2011 National Diabetes Fact Sheet published by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, documented that more than 25 million people in the United States have diabetes. 
They also estimate 75 million people live with a pre-diabetes condition. The large numbers 
have driven manufacturers to develop new pumps that allow for the patient’s glucose levels 
to be tested and insulin to be delivered in one system. The new systems have software and 
wireless capabilities to track and manage patients’ glucose levels. The advantages of these 
systems are that patients will be able to monitor and manage their blood glucose levels more 
efficiently. They will also be able to manage the device and watch for possible device 
malfunctions. The management is done by incorporating Bluetooth 4.0 into a small system 
that attaches to patients’ belts. The United States Food and Drug Administration cleared the 
use of insulin pumps in July 2012, using Bluetooth 4.0 technology to communicate 
bidirectional information about the patient. The pump also allows for the insulin to be 
administered without the need to touch or interact with the pump. This is a major 
advancement and is the gold standard for insulin pumps. The system can check glucose 
levels, communicate its need for insulin to the insulin pump, and activate the insulin pump to 
automatically inject the amount needed into the patient’s body.  
 The pacemaker is a device that followed the same path as the insulin pump. Prior to 
the 1920s, there were some early devices but nothing that affected the medical community. In 
1932, Albert Hyman developed a machine that he called the artificial cardiac pacemaker. He 
received a grant and was able to make the device smaller, but it still was very large in 
comparison to the devices of today. During the next thirty years, the pacemaker evolved into 
5 
 
a smaller device. Similar to the advancements of the insulin pump, the pacemaker advanced 
in technology, paralleling the advancement of industrial technology.  
 The first successful implantation of the pacemaker took place in Buffalo, New York, 
on June 6, 1960. The pacemakers during the 1960s were very limited because a sustainable  
battery power was difficult to find, holding back the evolution of the pacemaker. Developers 
started to use plutonium as a source of power in the early pacemakers, but hospitals had a 
hard time disposing of them, making plutonium no longer an option. Over the next 30 years, 
pacemakers only advanced when battery technology advanced. In 1990, a new type of 
pacemaker appeared that incorporated a process called cardiac resynchronization therapy. 
This coincided with the advancement of lithium batteries.  
 The next advancement came with the ability to connect the pacemaker wirelessly. In 
2009, the first Wi-Fi pacemakers were being designed and tested. The major advantage of a 
Wi-Fi pacemaker is the ability to monitor or remotely monitor the device. There also is the 
ability to manually adjust the device or alert people when the device is not working properly. 
The remote control is important due to the increase in patients that need pacemaker devices. 
The timeline (figure 1) of insulin pumps, pacemakers, and the mobile device industry 
shows a comparison between pacemakers and insulin pumps and that of mobile devices. This 
shows that mobile devices share the same wireless connection possibilities and can be used to 
link to wireless medical devices. The timeline also shows that medical devices developed 
wireless technology much later than mobile devices did leaving a learning curve existing 
between security and wireless medical device technology. Mobile devices have had 10 years 
of problem solving wireless security issues and have had time to develop security protocols.  
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Figure 1 Timeline Comparison  
This is a major factor because there are much higher stakes involved in medical 
devices compared to mobile devices. The mobile device market is advancing so quickly that 
a major security risk towards medical devices could come from the mobile device industry. 
The mobile devices of today are equipped with all the tools needed to perform sophisticated 
attacks on medical devices. 
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 The advancements in medical device technology have followed the same timeline as 
other medical devices. This timeline has been affected by the advancement in technology 
such as battery power, processor power, and transistor power. Medical devices fell behind in 
the implementation of wireless capabilities. The first wireless medical devices were being 
implemented in the middle to late 2000s, while mobile technology had been implementing 
wireless technology for 7 to 10 years prior. The change to a more flexible powerful medical 
device is extremely positive for the client. In the past 5 years our society has witnessed the 
life-changing benefits of some of these devices especially for people with disabilities. In 
2012 an Olympic runner was able to perform at normal to above normal levels due to his 
enhanced medical device. This brought about massive debate on the effectiveness of medical 
devices and their benefit to people. For the first time in history, the idea that a person can be 
medically enhanced by their devices had to be considered by the Olympic Committee. It is 
inconceivable by most people that a person who had their legs removed could have a 
strategic advantage over someone who had both of their legs. This is an awesome revolution 
in the advancement of medical devices, but also brings about ethical decisions that affect 
people who might be medically enhanced. 
 
1.3 Trust 
Security of medical devices and medical information is going to be a major issue in 
the next decade. Hospitals are quickly moving to paperless environments, industry is pushing 
out wireless medical devices, and mobile devices are starting to collect health data on 
individuals. Some of the tools already on the market for mobile devices can monitor your 
heartbeat, graph it, monitor your sleep patterns and wake you at the appropriate time.  
Hospitals are developing mobile device check-in systems that sync with their computers. The 
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rapid development of these systems provides a service that will benefit individuals.  Is there a 
balance and a method to keep this information secure and protect the information that is 
really needed? In the near future, someone with technical knowledge who wants to steal your 
identity could steal your Social Security number, name, address, credit card information and 
your medical and biological information. This information could also be used against 
politicians or people of influence to change votes or expose information to change public 
opinion about them.  
The reason why there is a lack of understanding of the security threat in this arena is 
that the information stored in doctors’ offices has been relatively secure and private. Most of 
the information was kept on paper copies in secure libraries that required physical access to 
retrieve information. This built a level of trust with the medical systems in our society. The 
trust has created a system of wireless communication that is very easy to compromise. 
Medical device companies have developed trust over the years by providing solid solutions 
to hospitals and patients. Much like the hospitals, medical devices were immune from 
hacking and security issues due to their construction as independent units. This trust is an 
important part of any industry’s development. Companies work hard to develop this trust and 
for the most part evidence supported their claims. With the quick advancement into arenas 
where industry is not completely aware of security flaws this trust model will be tested.  
The (figure 1.2) below diagrams the trust that has been developed by different 
organizations that are linked to the medical device field. This trust is a key player in 
assessing vulnerabilities within medical devices and where security breaches possibly could 
happen.   
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   Figure 1.2 Stakeholder Trust Model 
 
Trust exists due to years of success in keeping information relatively secure, but this 
trust needs to be tested and studied as the new technology advances the medical field. 
 The medical device industry is expanding extremely quickly. Every medical device 
company wants to be part of this advancing market and the benefits it can provide to patients 
and doctors. Having months of data on a patient’s situation can greatly affect the treatment 
and the effect of the treatment. This has been a breakthrough in medical effectiveness for 
patients. The next 10 years will see a major advancement in medical devices, just like the 
advancements in mobile devices have produced today’s iPhone—a pipe dream a mere 10 
years ago. Who is responsible for securing medical devices and keeping them up-to-date?
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CHAPTER 2   
Capacities and Obstacles of Securing Medical Devices   
To understand the complex issues of securing medical devices, it is important to understand 
the capacities and obstacles each participant has in the security architecture of a medical 
device.  The major investors in developing these types of devices have a lot to lose if security 
is not prioritized.  This chapter will introduce each player before going into deeper research 
on the capacities and obstacles of each organization.  
 
Figure 2 Stakeholder Capacities on Obstacles  
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2.1 Medical Device Manufactures 
Manufacturers have major obstacles in providing security for their devices. They have 
limited contact with patients who are users of the devices. Unless a company's philosophy 
involves patients most large medical device companies have a select group of users to help 
them design future devices. The manufacturers main goal is to make money; most of the time 
their focus is on the profit and not customer service. Recently, a few medical devices have 
been compromised in security tests by universities and well-known hackers. Many of the 
device companies have a stance that security is not an issue because there is a lack of attacks 
on devices. Manufacturers also have to deal with FDA legislation and the lack of legislation 
on removal of devices.  No clear FDA legislation has been developed on the acquisition of 
devices after they are used. There is important information on these devices that could help 
manufacturers create future designs with fewer security weaknesses. They also have to deal 
with lawsuits once a weakness is made public.  Once a weakness has been discovered, it 
doesn’t take long for litigation and television ads depicting flaws of devices to follow. 
Software developers are also at the beginning stages of device development programs. The 
manufactures capacity is to understand the software and the weaknesses within the devices.   
 
2.2 Software Developers 
Software developers have the ability to design systems that can be updated, build 
updates that plug weaknesses, and understand how the technology works in the device. They 
run into obstacles when their goal is to provide security and not to create a software solution 
needed to make a device work. Developers work on timelines and interpret code standards 
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differently. Software developers will have a limited scope and knowledge of advancing 
security threats. Software developers and manufacturers normally work together to create a 
device that is safe and reliable. Security is something that both of these players are starting to 
pay more attention to, but their focus will always be on speed to market and fiscal risk. 
 
2.3 Hospitals 
After the device is made and cleared by the FDA the hospitals start to implement 
these devices. Hospitals have some of the best ability to provide security for patients.  The 
question is who is the most responsible? The hospitals have the capacity to hire a security 
professional who specifically deals with medical devices. They have the capacity to establish 
update and security centers that would allow patients to regularly visit the hospital to receive 
security patches and updates. Doctors know how devices are operating and where they are 
located in a human body. They also have relationships with patients and can communicate 
directly with patients to see how devices are performing. They can hook up devices 
wirelessly and look at the device’s function to see if anything looks compromised. 
 Hospitals have some obstacles when dealing with the security of patients’ medical 
devices. Hospitals will have limited knowledge on current threats. In the past, security has 
not been a function of the hospital, for implanted devices, and they have no track record in 
providing security in this manner. Hospitals might see devices that were implemented by 
other hospitals and they do not have information on how these devices work. They also have 
no knowledge of the proprietary technology inside devices. Hospitals have limited capacity 
to deal with multiple failures at one time.  Medical device implants like pacemakers require a 
specialist to replace. Most hospitals only have one or two specialists available at any given 
time. If a wide scale attack affected pacemakers, hospitals would not have the ability to 
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perform multiple surgeries on multiple patients in a short period of time. Hospitals also 
would have problems with inventory of these devices. Most hospitals have a system that only 
allows so many devices each month to be allocated to their hospital. Medical sales 
professionals and internal ordering procedures have set up systems that determine the 
average amount of patients each month and only provide that many devices. For example, if 
the hospital provides an average of six pacemaker surgeries a month then there would only 
be six pacemakers in their inventory to replace. This isn’t a problem if they have to do seven 
surgeries, but it would be a problem if they had to do thirty. 
 
2.4 Clients 
A client will have firsthand knowledge of the device and the motivation to keep the 
device working properly. They will also have the ability to research current security threats 
and implement updates if they have the technical ability. However, clients also have the 
greatest risk in performing these types of device manipulations. The risk of failure has 
greater consequences for them than for other players. The average person with a medical 
device lacks a technical capacity to keep devices patched and updated with the latest security 
package.  The clients will have a lack of knowledge regarding possible threats. Clients will 
fear the unknown and fear that by doing an update they will crash or break their device.  We 
have all performed updates on computer systems that did not go well. What happens if you 
update a pacemaker and the update fails causing the device to crash? The risk of the device 
crashing is way too stressful for most clients to deal with.  
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2.5 FDA 
Finally, the government has some security capabilities that other groups do not have. 
The government will have access to the most current security threat information. 
Government is also seen as a compliance authority by clients, which helps with anxiety about 
security threats. The government also has legislative compliance authority over 
manufacturers of medical devices. The FDA has legislation about the development of 
medical devices. Recently they have focused more on security;  the FDA has gone as far as 
telling the manufacturers they need to  improve security and they have cited a few of the 
manufacturers for security compliance issues. However, the FDA has not set up any specific 
security rules for manufacturers to follow. 
 The government has major security obstacles they need to overcome to be 
able to handle this responsibility appropriately. Government has a lack of knowledge about 
medical devices and how to proceed. There are no current standards by the FDA on how to 
implement security protocol in medical devices. Emerging technology normally has a 
window of time when it is not understood or appreciated by the government. This window of 
time is not acceptable when dealing with devices that sustain human life. Initially, the 
government is slow to react to impending threats on institutions. An example of this is the 
attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11 and the information that was known before the 
attack. What will cause more fear in this nation than a wide scale attack on the medical 
infrastructure? Breaking the trust that has developed with these structures and inciting fear 
would be an ultimate goal of terrorist organizations. 
Looking at the inherent security capacities and obstacles there seems to be one player 
that comes to the forefront regarding the question posed earlier in this paper. This brings us 
back to who is responsible for securing medical devices.  
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One of the many challenges that the medical device industry faces in relation to 
security is the FDA has not yet developed appropriate procedures to obtain and store data. 
The FDA does do a good job at looking at mitigation techniques for attacks on medical 
devices that are unintended. Other devices can produce interference that might cause 
complications with medical devices. Wii controllers, MRI scanners, headphones, and metal 
detectors have all interfered with medical devices and the FDA has done a good job of 
communicating the implications of these devices. Where the FDA falls short is when there is 
a deliberate attack on a specific medical device. The reason why the FDA is weak in this area 
is that until now there hasn’t been very many structured attacks on individual devices. This is 
an oversight of the FDA because of the quick advancement of wireless medical devices. It is 
paramount that medical device companies and manufacturers start to look at comprehensive 
strategies from start to finish for this area of technology. If attacks started to happen on 
medical devices there would be a void in established procedures. Important forensic 
information would be lost or mishandled in a way that would make it hard to use in a court 
case. In the United States the time between a person’s death and their burial can be very 
quick. If the medical device is buried, then the process of collecting the data becomes 
extremely difficult and possibly requires a court or judge to make a decision. The time 
needed for this process could compromise the data.  
In March 2012, the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board, a public-
private federal advisory committee, offered a number of recommendations to the federal 
government regarding the security of medical devices including those with wireless 
capabilities, and in May 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a national 
security bulletin on security risks to medical devices. (ISPAB, p1) 
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In addition, information security researchers recently manipulated two medical 
devices with wireless capabilities a pacemaker and a type of infusion insulin pump—
demonstrating their vulnerabilities to information security threats. (ISPAB, p2) 
“Ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices is the responsibility of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA)—an agency within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS).” (ISPAB, p2) According to the FDA, to the extent that information security 
threats can adversely affect the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, the FDA 
considers relevant mitigation strategies as part of its premarket review process. (ISPAB, p2) 
The field of devices is getting more complex and more devices have wireless capabilities. 
The need for a clearly defined forensic process is evident. The information collected on these 
devices would greatly enhance the ability for manufacturers to develop devices that mitigate 
the security flaws within the device. The FDA and the manufacturers have to develop 
legislation and procedures in the handling of medical devices and the information on them 
after they had been used. The pacemaker that is buried in the ground provides no support for 
anyone. This is the first step that manufactures and the FDA need to pursue in order to have a 
better understanding of the security needs. Legislation would help provide a vital link to the 
information, if there is a legal situation, involving a security breach of medical devices. 
 Organizational theory has shown us that organizations will change to meet their 
environmental needs. In order for big medical companies to take security seriously there 
needs to be a change in the environment around them. The FDA plays an important role in 
developing this environment. It is important to start developing legislation and tightening 
developmental standards around security before the legal system changes the environment 
for us. If the FDA fails to tighten standards, then the obvious conclusion is that people will 
sue the device manufacturers for developing an inferior device that doesn’t have security 
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measures incorporated. There is plenty of evidence out there that security is an issue with 
these devices. Some of the large manufacturers have given press releases that have addressed 
this issue, yet have said it is not important at this point in time. Their stance on the subject is 
that since attacks are not currently happening, there isn’t a security issue. That is like saying 
since terrorism isn’t currently happening in this country, there isn’t a terrorist issue. The 
ability to foresee attacks has been a weak area in our government organizations. The 
government must be proactive to the threat that is out there regarding medical device 
security. The fact is our medical infrastructure is managed very irresponsibly. The FDA plays 
a key role in developing the culture and environment needed to force manufacturers to 
develop the security needed on devices. 
 Provided the FDA and manufacturers are unable to provide a solution for their 
devices, it would be feasible to hire a third party organization to make the changes.  The 
computer manufacturers have developed systems to provide security for individuals to stop 
identity theft. Could these types of systems be put in place to provide security and update 
services for medical devices?  The future holds the possibility that a person might have 
multiple medical devices that are all wireless compatible. These devices not only will 
communicate within the hospital but will also communicate with themselves and be 
interoperable with other medical systems. The current hospital systems are not equipped with 
the technology or technological skill to keep all of these systems consistently updated and 
monitored. This will open the door to a new type of medical hospital system: technology 
hospitals that specifically deal with updating medical devices and keeping the current 
security patches in place. This will bring insurance questions into play regarding who will be 
responsible for paying for technology staff to update devices. Computers need consistent 
updates and maintenance to keep the systems running smoothly. 
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Chapter 3  
Food and Drug Administration 
  The medical device industry is advancing extremely fast with the advancement of 
wireless technology incorporated into medical devices and the need for security. Medical 
device manufacturers play an important role in developing devices that are safe, reliable and 
secure. This added responsibility is extremely important as we develop multiple devices with 
wireless technology. Building trust for these companies will involve their ability to provide 
devices that keep people safe and their information secure. The FDA has a major role in 
developing appropriate security measures for manufacturers to incorporate into the designs of 
their devices. The FDA does not need to provide legislation that will hinder development of 
medical devices, but they do need to provide structured guidelines on the acquisition of 
devices after use, the development of security measures for wireless devices, and device 
failure protocols. Setting up the environment to allow manufacturers to develop devices with 
security as a major focus is important for the future of medical devices. When we look back 
at 9/11, we ask ourselves why we didn’t see the warning signs of an impending attack. The 
warning signs for an impending attack on our medical infrastructure are there if we look for 
them. The repercussions of a wide scale targeted attack or an intended attack could be 
catastrophic for our medical system and general population if we wait to implement 
standards for security on medical devices. It is important that medical device manufacturers 
understand their role in the development of devices and the potential side effects of 
developing an insecure device. History has shown us that as a window of opportunity opens, 
the amount of people providing solutions will increase. The legislation on developing 
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medical devices could remain vague.  This will lead to the development of devices by 
companies that may be insecure and have ethical issues. 
 
3.1 FDA Risk 
The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed 
innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable and by helping 
the public get the accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines and foods 
to maintain and improve their health. On the FDA’s home page their mission is; “The FDA 
has responsibility for regulating the manufacturing, marketing and distribution of tobacco 
products to protect the public health and to reduce tobacco use by minors.”(FDA, p1) 
Finally, the FDA plays a significant role in the nation’s counterterrorism capability. 
“The FDA fulfills this responsibility by ensuring the security of the food supply and by 
fostering development of medical products to respond to deliberate and naturally emerging 
public health threats.” (FDA, p1) 
 Does the bureaucracy of the Food and Drug Administration overlook warning signs 
that are already clearly apparent? To answer this question a look at some of the warning signs 
in the medical industry has to take place. We also need to look at how the FDA is handling 
these warning signs and if they are taking them seriously. 
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Figure 3.1 FDA Responsibilities  
(Regulation of Medical Devices: Background Information for international Officials. 
April 14, 1999. www.fda.com)   
 The figure 3.1 above represents the responsibilities of the FDA and the resources each 
District Office has or "inventory" of FDA regulated firms which are periodically visited 
And, an establishment inspection is performed to determine the status of the firm's 
compliance 
with laws administered by the FDA.(U.S FDA, p.10 )  This figure represents the percent of 
resources the FDA needs to supply to medical devices.  Because of the age of this 
information, it is safe to say the medical device oversight is slowing becoming the major 
focus of the FDA.  “The Investigations Branch within the District is charged with visiting 
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firms to perform inspections, the collection of samples for monitoring the status of products 
(including foods, drugs, cosmetics, biologics, radiation-emitting products and medical 
devices), and conducting investigations to obtain information upon direction from 
Headquarters.” (U.S FDA, p.10) 
 Implantable medical devices evolved to a point where over the past five years they 
started to use technology that allowed a doctor to monitor the device remotely. There are 
many advantages in developing this technology, but there have been some clear security 
issues that are also inherent to this type of technology. The FDA is aware that wireless 
medical devices are able to be hacked into and modified. This has been successful in multiple 
situations on specific devices. There have been many intrusions into the medical system to 
steal data and to alter data on patient records. There have been extreme cases where there has 
been a direct attack on medical information that led to the death of a patient. The Ruxcon 
BreakPoint security conference in Melbourne hosted a hacker known as Barnaby Jack who 
demonstrated that he could remotely hack a pacemaker and deliver a shock that would injure 
the client.  "The FDA may be looking at the effectiveness of medical devices, but it doesn’t 
audit the code", Jack said. “Maliciously crafted code has previously tainted software updates 
for lifesaving medical devices and reporting on the malware ticked off the manufacturer". 
(Storm, Darlene, p1)  That seems miniscule in comparison since Technology Review 
reported that medical equipment is “riddled” with malware and government officials found 
“computer viruses are ‘rampant’ on medical devices in hospitals.” (Storm, Darlene, p1)  
“Hospitals run older Windows operating systems that are not patched or protected with 
antivirus programs because officials fear the modifications will “run afoul” of FDA 
regulations. “(Storm, Darlene, p2)   
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The attacks are not isolated events and are increasing in their severity and frequency.  
Recently, a researcher showed the ability to compromise hospitals security and affect 
changes on a life-support device. Taking into consideration the severity of the attacks 
globally and the amount of different ways a hospital could be compromised there is a need 
for a higher level of clarity from the FDA. The FDA, instead of clarity, has posted some 
statements about these security issues. "Security falls outside the purview of the Food and 
Drug Administration, FDA spokeswoman Karen Riley said, “unless mandated measures 
taken to protect data end up causing problems". “We don’t weigh in on security per se, but on 
measures like encryption that might affect or could have an impact on product safety and 
effectiveness, we might look at it.’’ E. Cooney, (Fu. P14). Many different statements from 
the FDA have shown that their feelings toward security of medical devices involve other 
players and they do not feel solely responsible for developing the strategies for successful 
security implementation. 
 
3.2 FDA Organizational Roadblocks 
 Max Weber’s Characteristics of Bureaucracies gives us a window as to why the FDA 
chooses to take a vague stance on medical device security. The application of this theory 
focuses attention on a couple of principles that affect the FDA's decision process. The first 
area is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by 
rules; this is controlled, by laws or administrative regulations. (Shafritz, p77)  The FDA has a 
very structured hierarchal organization that has clearly defined jurisdictional areas and 
administrative regulations. This classical design and bureaucratic structure manifest in an 
organization that has difficulty responding to rapidly changing situations. The FDA does a 
good job when the definition and goal are clearly defined and the roles of the jurisdictions are 
23 
 
understood. The threats are identified and the FDA has developed organizational policies to 
deal with these threats. 
  The food industry in the United States is one of the best in the world because the 
FDA has imposed some standards on that industry. There also have been many years of 
developing the standards composed through trial and error along with many failures. The 
stance taken by the FDA on security of devices is intentionally vague so that the FDA does 
not have to take on the responsibility and the repercussions in case of a possible attack.  
Survival of the organization is one of the main goals in a bureaucracy. The unfortunate side 
effect of that is the FDA is being slow on their response to imposing threats and refuses to 
enact the proper policies or even report after a major attack happens. 
 The FBI was caught in the same type of circumstances before the 9/11 attack that 
helped mold the current structure of the FBI. The FDA has developed the tools to support 
and monitor proper drug use and oversight of food production and sales.  
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Figure 3.2 Organizational Structure FDA (www.fda.com) 
 
The statement provided from the FDA clearly indicates that the administrative support for 
security is not entirely accepted by the organization. Applying Weber’s theory to the 
administrative levels of the FDA finds that administrative level leaders do not have the 
knowledge necessary to develop the appropriate security standards. One of the effects of a 
clear conical organization is that there are patterns required as to how promotions within the 
organization are determined. Figure 3.2 show how the FDA is organized in a top down 
structure as most government organization.  This is important because the attitudes and the 
knowledge of the administrators reflect the mission and the goal of the organization. 
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The FDA, as an organization, to become better at securing medical devices is going to 
have to overcome some obstacles in their structure. One major obstacle they will have to 
overcome is their understanding of emerging technologies and the security threat they 
present. There is a struggle between the FDA and medical device developers that revolves 
around enabling devices to be developed that fall within FDA standards, but allow medical 
device companies to make money. The medical device industry is a lucrative competitive 
industry which causes companies to develop devices quickly and push the levels of oversight 
and restraint set up by the FDA.  Device companies know that when new technology is 
developed it can normally squeak through an FDA approval because the technology 
developed is unknown to the FDA. The new technology, in some situations, has not been a 
major concern due to the isolation of the technology and the small number of people putting 
it to use. 
The FDA as an organization is structured in a top-down Tayloristic design.  The 
Tayloristic structure has evolved over many years due to the nature of the product with which 
they are dealing.  The environment around them has forced the FDA into a system of very 
structured rules and regulations in order to keep tight tabs on substances that have potentially 
fatal results if unregulated. This mechanized structure of the FDA has a positive effect when 
dealing with chemicals or food items that need regulation. Even though the FDA is 
successful in monitoring the complex interactions of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
advancements of drugs are slow and for the most part easy to understand. One of the 
difficulties that a bureaucratic organization faces is its ability to be flexible and adapt to 
changing circumstances. The goal of the FDA is to provide safe food and drugs for the 
public, but their goal does not focus on security or terrorist activities. There is not any ready-
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made response for security within the FDA and this leads to a lack of understanding of the 
issues. 
 
 
3.3 510(k) Process 
The bureaucratic nature of the FDA has created the inability to change policy over the 
years. The current policy of 510(k) has left a loophole in the medical device industry. The 
Federal Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act requires a reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness before medical devices can be put to market. Devices that are deemed to have a 
risk to patients have to be cleared through a process outlined in section 510(k) of the Federal 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. There is some controversy over the oversight of this act and its 
ability to effectively decide what devices pose risk. The FDA does not have the knowledge to 
understand the potential security risks that are inherent in software. A medical device that 
looks secure and performs in a robust manner could be passed through the system without 
proper security on the device. Since computer security is a rapidly changing problem, the 
FDA needs to have a stricter policy on how this process works. A rationalist bureaucratic 
system, like the FDA, will need environmental pressures on them to make the necessary 
changes.  People will perform their written job responsibilities, in a bureaucratic system, but 
since computer security is being pawned off by the FDA a good argument  could be made 
that devices are not checked for nor have the proper computer security protocols.  
The 510 K process has been labeled as having major issues. The FDA is aware of its 
problem. The process is still being implemented because medical device makers and the FDA 
benefit from this existing application. The move within the agency is to reform this process 
and use a modification called PMA. The premarket approval is an in-depth evolutionary 
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process for medical devices, but 
it is an extremely expensive for 
the FDA and medical device 
companies. That is why it has 
been hard for the 510 K process 
to be shutdown, its popularity 
for both parties. Most of the 
medical devices are processed 
through 510k because medical 
devices companies have to show 
a willingness to address 
computer safety, conversely 
medical device companies do 
not need to show proof of 
safety.  One of the main goals of 
bureaucracies is to propagate its  
 
 
Figure 3.3 510K Statistics (Device Matters, p1) 
own agenda. The legislation that set up the 510 K process allowed for a cheap 
effective way for medical devices to get approval of the FDA. Thirty five years ago this 
process had its benefits, but with the complexity and the rapid development of new medical 
devices the FDA needs to move faster to revise the 510 K process.  The FDA will have to 
develop a system or rules that will be a game changer for medical device manufactures.   
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Both of these organizations are designed with a rational framework in mind. Medical 
device companies are very good at developing products that meet people’s needs but have 
obstacles when dealing with internal oversight of their product. The FDA has well-defined 
systems of oversight, but has lost touch with the advancing technology and has policies that 
are outdated. The two organizations are going to have to find a balance between them in 
order to secure the devices being produced. One of the ways to effect change in an 
organization is to change the environment around them. The FDA is a rational bureaucratic 
organization; but for them to make the changes needed to provide safe and secure medical 
devices for the future, they will have to use a different organizational structure.  Moreover, 
developing appropriate rules and oversight procedures the FDA could change the approval 
procedure to allow for tougher security standards. Using the open systems model the FDA 
would be establishing an environment for the manufacturers to alter their behavior. The 
partnership between manufacturers and the FDA will greatly influence how successful this 
transformation will be. The FDA has the power to enact legislation to alter the approval 
process. The product provided by the manufacturers would start a circular effect that would 
allow for security to be a major focus. Manufacturers will change their procedures if the 
environment makes it more profitable for them to comply with tougher regulations. The FDA 
already has this type of relationship with major pharmaceutical companies, but has failed to 
make modifications in the device area for many years. 
The FDA shares a unique role in securing medical devices. From the evidence currently in 
the newspapers, journals and universities it is clear that a new type of threat is arising. The 
FDA has counterterrorism capacities, but they have not recognized medical devices as a 
major issue.  The statements made by the FDA lead researchers and device manufacturers 
reveals that they believe that medical device security is a problem and something that we 
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should keep a watch on. The FDA is making a major mistake with their ability to assess the 
current threat of security issues. There is evidence that our hospital systems, medical devices, 
and patient records are extremely easy for hackers to acquire or tamper with stored 
information. Ten years ago, the capabilities we possess on our smart phones would be 
inconceivable. The jump in technology in medical devices, ten years from now, will advance 
at the same astounding rate. The 35 year old legislation on how medical devices are approved 
will underestimate the Complexity of these devices. The FDA stands at the cross roads to 
their future as an oversight entity for medical devices. Our history has shown us that 
bureaucratic organizations are slow to adapt to new technologies. I believe that the FDA will 
eventually make appropriate modifications to legislation allowing for proper evaluations of 
medical devices. I do not believe they will be able to make these changes without a security 
breach or a medical terrorist event happening. The current environment for providing 
security for these devices is not completely understood by the FDA. There is no sense of 
urgency to create a system that will allow monitoring of manufacturing for these devices. 
Will a major attack on the medical system be needed to motivate the environment allowing 
the bureaucracy to make the changes needed? For the first time in human history we are 
looking at the possibility of designing devices that will enhance human life.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Medical Device Manufacturers 
 
Security of medical devices and medical information is going to be a major issue in 
the next decade. Hospitals are quickly moving to paperless environments, industry is pushing 
out wireless medical devices, and mobile devices are starting to collect health data on 
individuals. Some of the tools already on the market for mobile devices can monitor your 
heartbeat, graph it, monitor your sleep patterns and wake you at the appropriate time to 
maximize your sleep.  Hospitals are developing mobile device check-in systems that sync 
with their computers and clients’ mobile devices. The rapid development of these systems 
provides a service that will benefit individuals.  Is there a balance that will provide a method 
to keep this information secure while protecting the information that is deemed essential? In 
the near future, someone with technical knowledge who wants to steal your identity could 
steal your Social Security number, name, address, credit card information and your medical 
and biological information through your medical device. There also is a potential to modify 
internal device information that could implicate you in an investigation or criminal event or 
mark you as unsuitable for types of insurance. This type of information could also be utilized 
against politicians or people of influence to change votes or expose information to change 
public opinion. We are stepping into a time period in society where trust in digital 
information is high while relying on its capability to aid in almost every aspect of life is 
accepted and expected.  
Over the past ten years, there has been a growing misunderstanding between the 
client, manufacturers, FDA, and hospitals when dealing with security issues and privacy. The 
reason there is a lack of understanding surrounding the security threat in this arena is that the 
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information stored in doctors’ offices has been relatively secure and private during the last 
twenty years.  Most of the information was kept on paper copies in secure libraries that 
required physical access for retrieval. There was HIPAA legislation that hospitals and 
manufacturers followed to keep this type of information secure and in the correct handlers. 
Medical professionals took the HIPAA legislation seriously and developed trainings and 
constant policy reminders throughout the industry concerning the severity of breaking  
HIPAA regulations.  The efforts helped patients develop a level of trust with the medical 
systems in our society. To obtain information about a patient, you needed to have hospitals 
physically send documents by mail or fax to another hospital.  The trust that has been 
created, over many years, of successful privacy and security policy is being challenged by the 
new digital heath record systems and medical devices that collect data about your current 
medical conditions.  
 Over the past few years a system of wireless communication and digital 
documentation has started to take the place of printed file systems. The advancement to 
electronic health record systems has had a profound effect on a hospital’s ability to keep and 
transmit records; for the most part, the ability to collect and create a profile of a patient over 
many years has led and will continue to lead to better health care for everyone. Along with 
all the positive aspects, there is also a dark side to having client data digitized. Digitized 
systems have had security breaches, lost client data and have known security issues.   On 
May 14, 2012, federal prosecutors charged one of the hospital's medical technicians at 
Howard University Hospital with violating the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act. Prosecutors say that over a 17-month period an employee used their 
position to gain access to patients' names, addresses and Medicare numbers in order to sell 
private information. Just a few weeks earlier, the hospital notified more than 34,000 patients 
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that their medical data had been compromised. (Schultz, p1) A contractor working with the 
hospital had downloaded the patients' files onto a personal laptop, which was stolen from the 
contractor's car. (Schultz, p1) The data on the laptop was password-protected but 
unencrypted, which means anyone who guessed the password could have accessed the 
patient files without a randomly generated key. (Schultz, p1)  
  The trust factor is a key element in assessing vulnerabilities within medical devices 
and where security breaches possibly could happen.  Trust exists due to years of success in 
keeping information relatively secure, but this trust needs to be tested and studied as the new 
technology advances the medical field. In order to address security issues with medical 
devices we need to look at each developmental step of the medical device development 
process. The manufacturer is one of the major stakeholders in the medical device field and 
they have the capacity to implement security along with major obstacles to overcome.  
 The manufacturer of medical devices has a major role in making sure they provide 
devices with security options. Manufacturers have the most control over the structure of the 
device and how a device is going to be accessed. They test the device and have in-depth 
knowledge of the device’s capabilities and weaknesses. Manufacturers have firsthand design 
information and the ability to access all parts of the system before they are sold. They also 
have an ethical responsibility for providing a medical device that is safe, secure and reliable 
for patients. The manufacturers have the funds and the ability to provide a device that can 
secure the information. They are in a very good position to provide this service for patients. 
Part of this service is they have to understand the risk their device has in the medical 
environment. To do this successfully, there needs to be a team of diverse individuals working 
together to assess device exposure and how to mitigate security issues within the device. 
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4.1 Risk Management 
 
   In order to develop a system that meets the needs of the hospitals and clients, 
manufacturers need to know how to manage their risk and assess what their exposure is. 
Hackers have a knack for finding and exploiting any system; the ability to develop a device 
that is unbreakable is as easy as building a ship that is unsinkable. It is important to think 
ahead, anticipating different types of issues and developing plans to block many of the 
common attacks or preparing to mitigate them if they happen. Manufacturers need to manage 
their risk by identifying both current and future risk factors. Identifying future risk can be 
difficult, but history has shown us with attacks like 9/11, it is important to look at the worst-
case scenarios. In the next few paragraphs I will address a few security threats that medical 
devices with wireless technology pose to the different players that deal with the devices. 
 One of the first steps that medical device manufacturers need to do in order to assess 
their risk is to develop a list of possible threats to their medical device. It is important to 
understand this so that proper mitigation can be developed and legal expenses can be 
minimized by the manufacturer. Implantable devices, like pacemakers, need to have 
extremely high integrity of care in order to keep patients safe and costs low. It is important to 
look at the different types of attacks that can affect the performance of a medical device. It is 
not only important to consider the immediate individual attacks, but to also design a 
framework for forecasting possible future attacks. Forecasting attacks has been one of the 
weaknesses that our government agencies have endured for many years so it is important that 
manufacturers look beyond the guidance of the government when dealing with these issues. 
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4.1.1 Exploits 
 Exploits are the ability to take advantage of a weakness in an operating system or a 
sequence of commands that takes advantage of vulnerability in a system. The goal of an 
exploit is to cause an unattended or unprotected system to fail or to anticipate behavior and 
control within a system. This is a problem for medical devices because you do not want 
unauthorized individuals to gain access or get privileges over the devices or information 
stored. Recently, research has been done on the ability to gain access to and gain influence 
over insulin pumps and make the insulin pump inject on command. This type of exploit can 
be difficult to deal with because it takes advantages of glitches or bugs in the software code. 
It is important that medical device manufacturers develop some update procedures to deal 
with glitches that arise after manufacturing. These devices hold important private data about 
the client. A glitch in the system that allows for information to be changed within a device 
could set the stage for an individual to commit a murder or alter the data to make it difficult 
for a patient to get treatment. One of the most likely outcomes of having wireless medical 
devices is that someone will develop a virus or a worm that will infect the implantable device 
causing it to malfunction or drain its battery. It is likely that a virus will be developed to 
propagate itself using the Bluetooth of a cell phone with no intention of infecting medical 
devices, but will cause issues with the medical devices unintentionally. 
 
4.1.2 Eavesdropping 
 With the development of more and more medical devices using wireless technology, 
one of the issues that has to be taken into consideration is the ability for people to eavesdrop 
information from these devices. Information is being collected on us daily through social 
network websites, where we shop, how we use our phones, and what we buy on the Internet. 
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The information on medical devices could include your personal information, your health 
status, your location, and your medical history. This information could be vital for identity 
theft and political advantage. Individuals eavesdropping for this type of information could 
use it to blackmail people of power and change public opinion of the potential political 
candidate. We have already seen some of this done when hackers hacked into a politician’s 
private emails and spread private conversations around the Internet. The potential for private 
medical information to cause turmoil within the political structure is very likely. Would we 
elect a senator if we knew they had undergone medical treatments for a disease that could 
affect their future?  
 
4.1.3 Social Engineering 
 Social engineering is probably one of the most difficult security threats to deal with. 
People design medical devices and some individuals can be manipulated to develop 
backdoors or bugs within a system to exploit at a later time. Social engineering is a new 
player in the field of security threats making it harder to understand how to protect devices 
from predesigned vulnerability. In the future it will be important for individuals with wireless 
medical devices to understand who is authorized to access the device. It will be important for 
the manufacturers to establish a security protocol for handling medical information. The 
confusion in the medical system we currently have makes it extremely easy for skilled social 
engineering individuals to trick clients into providing information about their devices.  The 
advancement of wireless technology and advanced software on medical devices will lead to 
the ability to social engineer malicious code that allows for backdoors into devices to exploit 
control or information within the code. It will be important for manufacturers to develop 
protocols that look for malicious codes before a device gets implanted in the hospital. 
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4.1.4  Direct Access Attack 
 One of the scariest types of attack and probably one of the least likely to happen is the 
direct access attack. The current devices that have adopted wireless technology have shown a 
weakness in their ability to keep outsiders from accessing the device. The newness of 
wireless technology in pacemakers and other medical devices means that there are not very 
many people who are currently using them so there are presently few who are at risk of a 
direct attack on their device. The number with the new devices will grow dramatically over 
the coming years. The problem is that most manufacturers of medical devices are currently 
aware of the risk and have chosen not to mitigate it at this time. This leaves the manufacturer 
in a state of legal ambiguity and clients open for personalized attacks on their device. The 
FDA needs to develop stricter policies towards known security issues and how these issues 
are handled. These devices require skilled surgeons and a hospital staff to implant during a 
surgery. A direct attack on a group of people in one area that have a certain type of device 
could cause an overload on the hospital staff. Most hospitals do not employ enough doctors 
to handle multiple pacemaker surgeries at the same time.  
 
4.1.5  The Dark Side  
 One of the main areas where our government organizations seem to come up short is 
the ability to think about future events. The FBI is a great organization but, during the 9/11 
attacks, the 9/11 commission assessed that the FBI suffered from organizational issues that 
didn’t allow them to foresee such events. Structures like the FBI also oversee the medical 
device industry. The FDA suffers from the same organizational roadblocks as all large 
organizations in our government do. The FDA has a history of moving too slow and taking 
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too long to make decisions. In no way am I blaming the FDA for future events that could 
happen with a breach of data on medical devices. The FDA is a great organization that serves 
the purpose for which it was designed. I do question the ability of an organization designed 
primarily for food and drugs to be able to assess a value in a fast-paced technological 
environment. It is important to look at possible threats that could exist, if things went wrong, 
and evaluate their potential risk with the expertise to develop mitigation for them before they 
happen. The threat of flying a plane into a building was never conceived or was unlikely until 
the events of 9/11. It is important to develop the concepts before a 9/11 type event happens in 
our medical device industry. The medical industry sustains a good part of our economy and 
would be a very likely target that would inflict terror on established nations.  The Table 4.1 
addresses some of the threats, targets and impacts of unsecure medical devices. 
Unsecure Medical Devices Future Issues ( What If)  
Threat  Target  Impact  
Private medical history released to 
public 
Political or candidate for office 
Private information swings public 
opinion of a potential office holder 
Attack of terrorism on medical 
infrastructure  
Medical device within  
hospital Infrastructure  
Loss of confidence and fear causing 
monetary damage 
 Information altered to implicate 
person in crime 
Medical device implanted Personal  loss, time, money, reputation  
Identity Theft Personal, to get treatment  
Treatments given to individual/ Capital 
for Hospital   
Identity Theft/criminal Personal, to plant information Respect, integrity, indictment 
Black market for updated devices Individuals, insurance,  Untrusted devices in hospital system 
Unreliable devices/software issues  Clients, insurance  Service, integrity  
Table 4.1 Future Issues with Unsecure Medical Device 
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4.2 HIPAA 
 
 The advancement of smart medical devices that store client data and transmit client 
data directly or through remote telemetry has led to a rising concern about the need for 
privacy of personal health records. “The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
issued the Privacy Rule to implement the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).” (OCR, 2003)  The rule standards address the 
use and disclosure of individuals’ health information as well as standards of individuals’ 
privacy rights.  “The major goal of the Privacy Rule is to ensure that individuals’ health 
information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health information needed to 
provide and promote high quality health care and to protect the public’s  health and well-
being.” (OCR, 2003)  The HIPAA law was designed to regulate 3 areas of law. First is the 
portability of insurance for employees between employers. Second is civil and criminal fraud 
enforcement. Third is a requirement to shift from paper-based systems to electronic-based 
systems for health care codes and standards.  With the shift to electronic health records, 
HIPAA also contains a set of “Privacy Rules” in order to keep this data secure.  The HIPAA 
law directly regulates covered entities that are composed of health care providers, health 
plans, and health care clearinghouses.   If a medical device’s manufacturer falls within this 
category, they have an obligation to provide a privacy officer, create HIPAA policies and 
procedures, privacy training, documentation, and safeguard information.  
 With the development of mobile smart devices and the acquisition of these 
technologies into the hospital the HIPAA law is being tested in a new dimension. Medical 
devices manufacturers find themselves in a situation that could get ugly if proper security 
solutions are not taken to protect client data.  There also needs to be a better effort by 
leadership to stress the importance of keeping client data secure. It is not uncommon for your 
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health information, including insurance information, to be located on many computers or 
company servers. This information is being downloaded onto mobile devices, flash drives, 
sd-cards, phones,  iPads,  laptops, and backup drives. In the near future this information 
could also be on your personal medical devices.  Data loss is easy to fix but at the same time 
becomes more and more difficult as medical data moves into smaller and more obscure 
locations. HIPAA privacy rules need to address this in a more concrete and understandable 
way. There also needs to be better training and understanding of the importance of the 
information that is being carried on mobile devices.  
 
4.2.1   Information Black Market 
  Current statistics show that a medical record has a black market worth of $50. It is 
important for medical manufacturers and all HIPAA compliant organizations to start treating 
customer data like they would treat 
money. If you only priced a person’s 
information at a dollar and loaded 
numerous files on a storage device, it 
would be the same as, but you would 
never send the $375,000 of 
information by FedEx. If you 
multiply that number by the $50 for  
      Table 4.2   cash value of $18 million 
 
 
 
40 
 
individual information on the black market you would have a dollars. The systems in place to 
protect that type of money are extremely secure and I would think you would be questioned 
if you packaged the box with $18 million and sent it by UPS, FedEx or USPS. This is just 
one of many cases in the Department of Health and Human Services breach-of-data database. 
It is painfully clear that we are not putting the same security on digital data that we did on 
paper data or money. Only after a massive data loss are appropriate steps taken to secure the 
information. It would be un-thinkable that a company would need to lose millions of dollars 
in order to understand that they should keep their money safe. In many ways there is no 
distinction between physical money and the data in these records. It is difficult to find exact 
numbers on the worth of a client’s data or individual records.    
   
4.2.2 HIPAA Solutions 
 The regulations of HIPAA do a good job of outlining privacy concerns and what type 
of data needs to be protected. All documents need consistent updating to address the 
advancement of technology into the medical field. Emerging technologies must be examined 
to determine how the HIPAA law applies to them. A major step for the HIPAA law will be to 
get medical device manufacturers to seriously understand what information is on their 
devices, what their risk is, what their vulnerability is, and what their business has at stake if 
this information is lost. Manufacturers need to do a better job of training their sales force and 
their internal employees on the implications of losing this data. There is not a fancy technical 
fix for this problem. Theft and loss of equipment ranks the highest when speaking of data 
loss. This can be mitigated through tougher consequences on the manufacturers and better 
education on the information being stored and keeping it secure. It is better for companies to 
be proactive and develop secure measures of transferring data than to deal with the financial 
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loss and lawsuits when data is lost.  Manufactures need to develop the understanding 
company-wide that protecting this data directly relates to business drivers and mission goals. 
 
4.3 Manufacture Software design 
 
New devices are coming on the market daily that incorporate wireless technology creating a 
growing concern about their security. The FDA database for Medical & Radiation Emitting 
Device Recalls, found that from 2002–2010, there were 537 recalls of medical devices that 
affected as many as 1,527,311 individual devices in the U.S.( FDA, 2011, p5)  The FDA 
found the amount and quality of information in the reports to be highly variable across 
manufacturers. The lack of reports indicated a significant proportion of devices manufactured  
malfunction failed to contain adequate information about the root cause of the problem This 
limits the FDA’s ability to identify, track, and address device safety problems. This suggests 
that the manufacturers may not have conducted appropriate follow-up or simply did not have 
adequate policies to deal with mass device failures. Not only are devices failing due to 
software and hardware issues, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of 
Inspector General’s adverse event reports suggest that there is a serious weakness in the 
oversight of reported issues. 
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  Table 4.3.1 (US DHS OIG, 2009)  
This report finds that medical device manufacturers reported adverse events within the 30 
day window but not within the five day window. Eighty nine percent of all 30 day reports 
were on time, but the five-day reports were late many times.  Thirty nine percent of the 
reports that involve 
death or injury were 
submitted late to the 
FDA. To complicate 
the matter, CDRH 
does not consistently 
read adverse event  
  Table 4.3.2 (US DHS OIG, 2009) 
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reports for the first time in a timely manner. Less than one third of the reports were read for 
the first time in 30 days and less than half within 60 days. Manufacturers rarely get fined for 
submitting reports late and/or incomplete.  
 With the future of medical devices booming, is this the type of reliability we want 
integrated into our body? This brings us back to the heading in this section, I am not 
confident that our government fully understands the implications of having buggy non-
reliable devices integrated into the human body. The human body is a reliable machine and is 
going to require technology as durable as Voyager to be successfully integrated in our 
society. There also is an issue with upgrading medical devices that are implanted within the 
body. When new devices become available on the market will clients want to update to the 
new device because of its new capabilities and health benefits? The current generations are 
used to the ability to upgrade and to increase performance of technology in their possession. 
How will manufacturers deal with the reality of clients who will want the new device even 
though their current device is functioning properly? These questions will need to be sorted 
out by the FDA and the manufacturers in the near future. 
Issues with securing medical devices are going to be at the forefront of medical 
device design in the next 10 years. There are complex issues that need to be dealt with in a 
systematic manner. One of the ways this can be done is to use a method framework such as 
SABSA. An organized framework that develops common language and communication 
between the FDA, manufacturers, medical facilities, software developers, and clients, is 
going to make a difference in developing devices with high integrity in their design. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Hospitals 
 The hospitals are the final stakeholder in securing medical devices. They find 
themselves in a unique position between the client, manufacture and government.  The 
hospitals have become the battle ground on which device security is applied.  Hospitals are 
the central focus on the battle to secure medical devices. While interviewing hospital security 
professionals, it became clear that not only is there a huge gap in the understanding of the 
risk these devices have to the client, but a major disconnect between internal policies with in 
the hospital system.  It is important to look at the stakeholder’s capacities and how they can 
use these capacities to help secure devices. In the chart above, there is a list of capacities that 
the hospital has to help mitigate the security issues. The hospital has a very challenging 
future with the advancement of more complicated and more connected medical devices. The 
following section we will address some of the major issues within the hospitals and how they 
can address these issues to become a more secure environment for all medical devices 
including implantable medical devices. 
5.1 Hospital Structure 
 One of the main issues with considering medical devices in the current hospital 
system is the structure that has developed over many years in the hospital. Because of the 
complex nature of the hospital system, the organizational structure of a hospital leans 
towards pillars of power under the director of the division. This means that most hospitals 
have department heads, a Board of Directors, a CEO of the hospital and etc. With many 
layers of administration the decisions that are made about equipment and the acquisition of 
new technology does not have a clear path for approval. Doctors and department heads have 
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the ability and the budget to equip their department with new technologies without the 
approval from a higher power. To compound the situation, medical device representatives 
bring new technologies into the hospitals for doctors to use and to learn on. All of these 
structures have been designed to improve the speed and the acquisition of technology for the 
betterment of the client. New technologies have extreme benefits for health and prosperity of 
the hospital. The emotional factor for the acquisition of these technologies overlooks 
systemic risk to the hospital. 
5.2 Issues Securing Medical Devices 
 Having new technologies and the ability to access the technologies quickly has led to 
many issues within the hospital system. If you look at the incident report for lost data, it is 
easy to see that stopping breaches in data loss have to do more with quality policy and 
enforcement than developing systems that keep intruders at bay.  A report recently released 
by the FDA outlines some of the difficulties hospitals will face in the future.  
“Recently, the FDA has become aware of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and incidents that 
could directly impact medical devices or hospital network operations, including: 
Network-connected/configured medical devices infected or disabled by malware; 
• The presence of malware on hospital computers, smartphones and tablets, targeting 
mobile devices using wireless technology to access patient data, monitoring systems, 
and implanted patient devices; 
• Uncontrolled distribution of passwords, disabled passwords, hard-coded passwords 
for software intended for privileged device access (e.g., to administrative, technical, 
and maintenance personnel); 
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• Failure to provide timely security software updates and patches to medical devices 
and networks and to address related vulnerabilities in older medical device models 
(legacy devices); 
• Security vulnerabilities in off-the-shelf software designed to prevent unauthorized 
device or network access, such as plain-text or no authentication, hard-coded 
passwords, documented service accounts in service manuals, and poor coding/SQL 
injection.”(US, FDA, 2013) 
 After analyzing the incidents of loss data it shows that hospital policy is a major 
concern when it applies to securing medical devices and HIPAA data.  Looking at the top 10 
percent of reported data loss; only a small portion actually came from vulnerability in a 
system that was exploited. This information is vital to the development of an organization 
that is responsible for keeping data secure and private. The HIPAA legislation is clearly 
defined that any loss of client data is not considered acceptable.  
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                   Figure 5.2 Types of Data  Loss  
 
12,937,894
780,000
6 %  from 
Hacking 
Top 10
Percent
Hacking
94% Percent from: 
1. lost data
2. Theft
3. Lost device
4. Portable devices
 
  Figure 5.2.1  Percent from Hacking  
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                  Table 5.2.2 Top Ten Incident Report 
 
The table and figures above were calculated from the U.S Department of Health and Human 
Services incident Report.  This report list all breaches reported over when hospital or 
medical facilities loss over 500 or more individual records. The report can be found at 
(http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.h
Federal law has required health care providers to report to the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the news media all data breaches affecting 500 patients or more. 
 
Health Care 
Provider 
State Patients Affected 
Type of 
Breach Date 
TRICARE Virginia 4,901,432 
Loss of 
backup 
tapes 
Sept. 13, 
2011 
Health Net, Inc. California 1,900,000 Unknown Jan. 21, 2011 
North Bronx 
Healthcare 
Network 
New York 1,700,000 
Electronic 
medical 
record theft 
Dec. 23, 
2010 
AvMed, Inc. Florida 1,220,000 Laptop theft 
Dec. 10, 
2009 
The Nemours 
Foundation Florida 1,055,489 
Loss of 
backup 
tapes 
Aug. 10, 
2011 
Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of 
Tennessee 
Tennessee 1,023,209 Hard drive theft Oct. 2, 2009 
Sutter Medical 
Foundation California 943,434 
Desktop 
computer 
theft 
Oct. 15, 2011 
South Shore 
Hospital Massachusetts 800,000 
Loss of 
portable 
electronic 
device 
Feb. 26, 
2010 
Utah Department 
of Health Utah 780,000 Hacking 
March 10, 
2012  
Eisenhower 
Medical Center California 514,330 
Computer 
theft March 2011 
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tml) It is important to understand where the vulnerabilities are in the hospital so that 
proper policies can be developed and system wide mitigations can be designed. The 
hospital systems are in the best position to develop solutions to the problem of security. One 
of their most important capacities is their ability to control how medical devices are 
interacting with the clients and how manufactures meet the needs of the hospital in order to 
improve client care.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Technical Security Issues with Pacemakers  
 Security issues with medical devices are becoming a hot topic in the medical field and 
the news media.  This has led to many opportunities for the information to be misunderstood 
or overestimated the ability for someone to compromise a medical device.  Over the past 2 
years I have obtained a set of pacemakers and the programmer, with the goal to pentest these 
devices.  I wanted to see what type of security these devices had on them and what possible 
vulnerabilities they might have.  By looking at the technical aspects of pacemakers and there 
programming, it has also given me a better understanding of the security issues hospitals are 
dealing with.  My research in to the devices has also given me some ideas on how to mitigate 
security problems.  These issues are important for hospitals to deal with so that they are in 
compliance with HIPAA regulations.  It is also important to understand what can and cannot 
be done so that clients are not worried about possibilities that are unlikely to happen. 
6.1 Pacemaker 
Obtaining pacemakers for research we easer then I thought it would be. After I made contact 
with a sales representative, I social engineered the name of a contact that use scratch and dent 
pacemakers for animal usage. After a short phone conversation I persuaded them into 
sending me 4 pacemakers, two dual chambers and two single chambers.  The cover price for 
these pacemakers is about 30,000 dollars.  The ability to obtain these types of devices 
constitutes a security issue.  The information and the knowledge a person can gain from  
    Figure 6.1 Pacemakers for Research 
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owning a device and pentesting it is much higher than if the devices were not on the market. 
The ability to own a pacemaker and reverse engineer it should not be allowed. The next step 
was to see if I could dismantle a device in order to find any known chips or internal 
mechanisms that have exploits and reverse engineer. This type of activity should not be 
allowed. The next step was to see if I could dismantle a device in order to find any known 
chips or internal mechanisms that have vulnerabilities.  Pacemakers are molded out of 
surgical stainless steel and welded around the seams with the same material.  There is also a 
resin plastic substance on the top that is molded to the device. Getting access to the inside of 
these devices is very difficult.  I took a dermal drill and cut slowly around the edge until I  
    Figure 6.1 Pacemakers for Research 
could pry the two pieces apart.   The internal workings of pacemakers are very technical and 
involved. Besides what is publicly known about the physical limits of the device, I could not 
find any physical vulnerabilities. Pacemakers are vulnerable to interference from radios and 
magnetism.  People that have pacemakers installed need to be aware of scanners, shortwave  
radios, and  any device that transmits radio frequencies. After close examination of the 
internal chips and  resistors, most of the internal design was developed specifically for the 
task of performing a shock to the heart. I could not find any evidence of known 
vulnerabilities in chip design or common resistors that might have public exploits. 
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 The pacemaker performs a complicated task , but at the same time its design is 
simple. To commicate with the device you need to have a programmer designed with 
software and equipted with a programming head to interrogate the device. Both the 
programmer and device communicate through a wireless connection using a radio frequency  
   Figure 6.1.1  Inside a Pacemaker 
(RF) of 175 Khz.  To start this process, a magnet is placed over the device, putting it in to 
programming mode.  The pacemaker and programming device will communicate and start 
transferring information over the RF  connection. The frequency is very weak, and does not 
transmit very far in order to save the battery life of the device.  
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  Figure 6.1.3 Inside the Programming Head  
 The Figure 6.1.3 is the internal antenna and magnet of a pacemaker programmer. The 
main processor holds a lot of information and a history of the workings of the device. Most 
of the information on the processor is client specific. The information that the device holds 
somestimes depends on the programmer of the device. There are places in the programming 
to enter items such as client ID and patient notes.  Some hospitals use Social Secuiry 
Numbers for tracking client records and the patient notes area could include any client data 
the doctor deems important. 
 
Programming head 
Magnet  
RF 175KHz 
Antenna  
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  Table 6.1.4  Information on Pacemakers  
The information above is a list of data that is found programmed on a pacemaker. Some of 
the data is common and can be found in the phone book and some of the data is clearly 
defined under HIPAA to keep private for the client. The pacemaker also keeps a running 
record of past data that can be downloaded and analyized. This record can be pulled off the 
device at any time to get the history of the client. The information does need to be stored in a 
safe location and analyized for possible family history implications. The data history on 
pacemakers  are also windows in to the the period of time preciding death. This time period 
could be valuable in a case of unknown death or homicide. The figure 6.1.5 on the next page 
is an example of historical data pulled off a pacemaker. If a hacker did end up causing a 
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fatality, there would be forensic information stored on a pacemaker that would pin point the 
exact time of death or possible tampering.  
 
 Figure 6.1.5 Pacemaker Memory History  
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6.2 Pacemaker Maker Device Security Conculstions 
 Over the past few years, the question of whether a pacemaker is secure has been 
asked by many people and organizations. The main pacemaker companies have stated that 
the risk of someone hacking into a pacemaker and causing a fatality is very low and is not a 
concern for them at this point. After spending some time looking into pacemakers and what 
knowledge is needed to perform an attack on an individual person, it is my belief that 
pacemakers are secure enough at this point in time. I also believe that with the advancement 
of technology towards more wireless devices, pacemakers are going to have to be more 
rigorous in their implementation of security standards. As these companies develop new 
pacemakers with Bluetooth and more advanced wireless connections security issues will 
advance also. At this point, for someone to attack somebody by using their internal 
pacemaker as a weapon, it would take a lot of knowledge and internal know-how of the 
pacemakers to perform this attack. The attacker would also have to be in relative close 
proximity to the target to perform the task. When you add up the limitations of the wireless 
capabilities of pacemakers I do not believe that any type of wide scale attack would be 
possible. Furthmore, I believe that high interest targets could have a different risk threshold 
than the average pacemaker patient. That being said, political figures and high-level 
executives might consider alternatives due to potential security issues with pacemakers at this 
point. 
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6.3 Programmers as An Attack Vector 
 Another device I looked at during my investigation into pacemakers was the 
pacemaker programmer. The pacemaker programmer is a device that is used to connect to the 
pacemaker and program information within an internal pacemaker. It is made up of a 
programming head and a small program that 
allows the programmer to change functions and 
parameters of pacemakers. I obtained my 
programmer from eBay for around $200.  
My first assessment of the programmer is that if 
a situation or vulnerability is going to be 
exploited in a pacemaker it most likely will  
 Figure 6.3  Programmer Unit  
come from the programming machine. After spending some time learning the operating 
system I am not confident that the programmer has any type of security systems that would 
stop someone from compromising the system. 
 The programmer communicates with the pacemaker through the programmer head. 
The programmer head is a magnet and an RF antenna that connects directly to the 
implantable device. The procedure is to hold the head about 3 inches from the internal device 
and push a button that interrogates and makes a connection to the pacemaker. In the chart 
below 
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    Figure 6.3.1 175 KHz Handshakes  
you can see the handshake that is happening at about 170 to 175 kHz. Once the connection is 
made there is a menu that allows you to program information into the device. One of the 
areas of concern for me is that there was no authentication process by the programmer before 
it interrogated the device. The process for interrogation was to turn on the switch and hold 
the programming head over the pacemaker. Anyone could do this without authenticating who 
they were. This is a huge security issue, because this tells me that the pacemaker will trust 
the programmer at all costs. Never during the process was I asked to authenticate who I was 
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with the programmer or the pacemaker. The assumption the manufacture is making is that the 
hospital will be the only one with a programmer and they have the best intentions for the 
client. Because there is an unauthenticated trust between the pacemaker and the programmer, 
someone that wants to mess with someone’s pacemaker could design a tool from a 
programming machine without any advance knowledge of the client’s pacemaker.  The 
attacker would still have to be in close proximity but they could change anything they wanted 
to internally. 
 The second major issue with the programming device is how it was obtained through 
eBay. EBay and other auction sites are riddled with medical devices like this one. When I 
received this device it had not been properly cleaned and was in violation of HIPAA policies. 
These types of programming devices keep records of past clients data on their hard drives. 
When I received this device it had about 60 records of past client pacemaker interrogations in 
the print buffer. When I updated the device with the current software, the manufacturer did 
make an attempt at providing some level of security for past records. You can now set the 
device to delete the print button buffer and past interrogations on each shutdown. This will 
stop a person from opening the device and downloading a file onto a USB drive, but I believe 
all this information is still present on the hard drive after it’s been deleted. There is no 
evidence that a cleaning process is going on after a file is deleted. The only upside I can see 
is that the hard drive is rather small and old reports would be overwritten at some point. The 
information below on figure 6.3.2 is a report I pulled off the programming machine that I 
received from eBay. This information would be considered a violation of HIPPA and could 
result in large fines and loss of patient confidence in keeping their records safe. This 
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Information could also be used to tarnish a person’s reputation or used to blackmail people in 
high positions.  
 
   Figure 6.3.2  Data Stored on Device  
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Another major security issue with the programming device is its update process. The device 
is programmed to link to the company’s server and download updates. This is done rather 
quickly without any type of verification that you are receiving a valid update from the 
appropriate place. If someone broke into the manufacturer’s update database and placed 
some simple promiscuous software, the programmers would automatically trust that this 
software is okay to install on the device. Placing a virus or exploitable code could easily 
infect many programming devices before it was found.   
 When comparing the two devices, it is my opinion that the programmer has more 
security vulnerabilities than the pacemaker. Manufacturers could do more with the 
pacemaker to ensure that a hacker could not connect to the signal and make changes, but at 
this moment there is little evidence suggesting the need for such advanced security. The 
likelihood that an individual will independently get hacked and their device altered is very 
low. The impact is also very low because it is affecting only one individual at a time. I am 
more concerned with the lack of security on the programming device. If a wide scale attack 
could happen it would most likely originate from an infected server at the manufacturers 
when updating a malicious code into the pacemaker. This could be easily mitigated by hash 
values and encryption. It will also be important for hospitals to place these programming 
machines with appropriate prioritization in the hospital infrastructure. If manufacturers are 
unwilling to develop the authentication processes and security around these devices, then it 
will be up to the hospitals to design architectures that mitigate their security vulnerabilities. 
This will be important for pacemaker programmers and all other wireless and wired medical 
devices within the hospital. 
62 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Solution Enterprise Security Architecture for Medical Devices 
 
 The medical device industry and implantable medical devices are on the brink of 
major advancements. It is important to look at all solutions when dealing with a complicated 
problem of this magnitude. Currently, some of the major hospitals are already dealing with 
over 50,000 connected devices in their hospitals. This does not include patient devices, 
patient laptops, mobile devices and any other wireless device that is brought into the hospital 
by visitors. In the confusion, the security professionals at a lot of these hospitals are bogged 
down with putting out technical fires every day. A solution to help secure medical devices 
needs to be developed from all silos within a hospital, working together under the same goals 
and objectives that have been agreed to by the risk holders within the departments. Any other 
type of solution might have short-term effect, but not long-term sustainability. 
 
7.1.1   Technical Solutions the Wrong Path  
 The security issues with medical devices do have some technical solutions. These 
technical solutions vary from device to device. Some of these solutions range from designing 
wireless shields so that intruders could not interrogate internal medical devices, to 
sophisticated network intrusion detection systems and network architectures that allow for 
specific connectivity of devices while blocking others. During my process of researching this 
topic I had the opportunity to be part of a group of hospital technology administrators in 
Minneapolis. During these conversations it became clear to me that the hospitals were all 
dealing with the same issues of prioritization due to the amount of devices on their network. 
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This is a problem within the hospital structure because there are so many systems that have 
high prioritization needs. There are also many systems that are preconceived to need high 
prioritization but the perception is only there because the individuals have power within the 
organization. These complex structures leave security professionals in a situation where they 
do not understand what is most important within their system to protect. Most of the 
professionals understood the importance of protecting patient data and maintaining system 
integrity, but failed to see the interconnections between the mission goal of the hospital and 
the device’s priority on their network. Designing a technical fix will only solve a short-term 
problem on a specific device that will only be implemented for a short amount of time. This 
has been a failure with both the manufacturers and the hospital. There was a time when 
technology fixes would solve the problem, but when you’re dealing with 50,000+ devices 
there needs to be a more systemic approach and a prioritization of what is most important to 
achieve the goals of your organization. Pairing the technological fixes with an organizational 
architecture that supports security is the only way to deal with security problems long-term. 
The tradition of looking at security issues through the eyes of a component based solution 
has continuing security issues for the medical device industry. Looking at security from a 
bottom-up component level leads towards misunderstandings and confusion about why 
certain devices need to be secure. Going this direction might secure devices for a short 
amount of time, but there is no long-term solution for any device due to updates and 
advancement in technology. This causes a feedback loop in the system that ends up costing 
the hospitals and the manufacturers a lot of money. There is a roadblock in communication 
that develops between the security departments and the business departments. This is a 
common problem in many industries in the security field. Security professionals struggle to 
communicate to management the reasons why specific devices are indispensable because the 
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goals  of security personnel often do not align with the business’s objectives. Because of the 
size of this problem and the complexity of medical devices, it is important to align the 
objective and goals of the organization with the goals of the security department.  
 
7.2 Developing the Framework for Common Communication 
 There are many architecture models out there for providing security to complex 
systems like hospitals. I chose the Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture Model 
(SABSA), because it is a methodology for developing risk and opportunity focused 
enterprise security and information assurance architectures. This architecture strength lies 
within its ability to develop a common language between domains in a business and define 
who is responsible for certain risks in the organization. This architecture also gives the 
security professional the ability to have traceability upward and downward through the 
company’s organizational structure. The reason this is important is, as more and more 
devices are incorporated into the medical system, there needs to be a clear structure on where 
the risk falls, who’s responsible for the risk, and how does the device being implemented 
affect the goals of the hospital. The technical part of security is still very important in this 
model, but it is just one piece of the puzzle that allows an organization like a hospital to 
prioritize medical devices and understand which ones need the most security. The first step in 
this process is to find the business requirements or goals of the hospital. Once you have the 
business goals or requirements you need to link them with business drivers for security. In 
essence, the security professional needs to ask themselves what they can do to enhance and 
support the business goal or requirement of the organization or hospital. 
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7.2.1 Developing Stakeholder Objectives 
 A primary security objective is to maintain the privacy of personal and business 
information that is stored, possessed and communicated by the organization’s system. Using 
a system that links a security driver with the business requirement allows for the security 
professional to have traceability when they present the need for specific security policies or 
hardware. The chart below is an example of business requirements in the hospital and 
examples of security drivers that are linked together. This is an important step in the security 
process in providing a system that knows how to prioritize what devices are most important 
to the overall business requirements of the hospital. These are the first steps in providing the 
security professionals the ability to communicate at all levels the need for security elements 
within the hospital system that are traceable to the mission of the hospital. One of the 
common threads that exist in the security field is the inability of security professionals to 
communicate to upper management the need for certain equipment. Following these steps 
will eliminate frustration because security personnel will be speaking in business language, 
and the decision will be based on risk to the business requirement instead of the ability to 
communicate with an individual manager. Table 7.2 is a list of typical hospital related 
business requirements and/or goals that I have found by looking at local hospital web pages 
and interviewing contacts that work in the hospital setting. 
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Business Requirement 
of Hospitals  
Security Drivers linked to Business 
Requirements  
Patient Pain 
Management  
1. Provide Support to the claims made by 
the organization about its competence 
to carry out its intended function.  
 
Patient privacy  
1. Maintain the privacy of personal 
and business information that is 
stored, possessed and 
communicated by the organization’s 
system. 
  
Return on Investment  
1. Maintaining the accuracy of 
information. 
2. Preventing losses through financial 
fraud. 
3. Ensuring the system security solution is 
cost effective and provides good value 
for money.  
Reputation   
1. Protecting the reputation of the 
organization, ensuring that it is 
perceived as competent in its sector.  
Compliant with 
Regulations  
1. Ensuring that the organization is at all 
times compliant with the laws and 
sectorial regulations and that the 
information security approach in 
systems directly and indirectly supports 
legal compliance.  
   Table 7.2  Security Drivers  
 
7.2.2 Designing Attributes Taxonomy 
 The next step in this process is to look at the business drivers for security and develop 
a list of attributes for them. An attribute is defined as a conceptual abstraction of the real 
business requirement. This allows for complexity and flexibility to be engineered into a 
system of set specifications. The attributes are normalized language that is designed to 
measure performance to the stakeholders. This part of the process is called attributes 
profiling. Each attribute requires a measurable approach or metric to define a set of 
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performance targets to be reached. The performance targets are then used for reporting how 
well you are achieving your main goal. This is important because in past security systems 
there were no meaningful measurements that could be reported to management on how the 
system was meeting the stakeholder’s main objectives. This ability to have traceability of 
security mitigation procedures and technology will help improve overall buy-in by the whole 
organization.  Developing a list is very important step in the process; it is used to 
demonstrate that there is a full understanding of the requirements and to gain buy-in and 
support for developing the solutions. It gives an organization the ability to define what is 
meant and how to get to their goal. By developing the attributes you’re creating a culture that 
will support security throughout a hospital setting. Having a high level of buy-in will allow 
greater security in every aspect of the hospital’s mission. Below is a chart of the business 
requirements with the attribute profile for each requirement. The table 7.3 show the link 
between the business requirement and the security attribute. This is done so security 
professionals can link an measurable term with needs and goals of the hospital.  
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Business Requirement of Hospitals  with Attributes  
Business 
Requirement of 
Hospitals  
Security Drivers linked to Business 
Requirements  
Attribute Profile  
Patient Pain Management  
1. Provide Support to the claims made by the 
organization about its competence to carry out its 
intended function.  Monitored, Consistent, 
Timely 
Patient privacy  
1. Maintain the privacy of personal and 
business information that is stored, possessed and 
communicated by the organization’s system. 
Protected, Accountable,  
Return on Investment  
1. Maintaining the accuracy of information. 
  
2. Preventing losses through financial fraud. 
Auditable, Cost-Effective  
3. Ensuring the system security solution is cost 
effective and provides good value for money.  
  
Reputation   
1. Protecting the reputation of the organization, 
ensuring that it is perceived as competent in its 
sector.  Reputable, Competent, 
Credible 
Compliant with Regulations  
1. Ensuring that the organization is at all times 
compliant with the laws and sectorial regulations 
and that the information security approach in 
systems directly and indirectly supports legal 
compliance.  
Enforceable, Legal,  
Regulated  
 
    Table 7.2.2 Attributes  
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7.2.3 Threat Domains and Threat Agents 
 A good practice for hospitals to assess possible threats is to use a framework and 
some kind of threat modeling technique. One of the threat modeling techniques in the 
SABSA architecture is the threat modeling framework. This framework allows for people to 
look at a possible threat by defining the threats in domains and agents. The threat domains 
are people, processes, systems, and external events. The agents are examples of these 
domains. Below is an example of how this framework is designed from the Enterprise 
Security Architecture: A Business-Driven Approach book.  
Threat Domains and Threat Agents (SABSA ) Enterprise Security Architecture John 
Sherwood,  Andrew Clark, David Lynas, 2005 
Threat Domain Description of Domain Threat agents 
People Losses caused by: Current employees 
  Violation of internal policies Past employees 
  Negligent violation of internal policies People under consideration for  
  Human errors employment 
Processes Unintentional losses caused by: Employees 
  Deficiency in existing procedure Customers 
  Absence of suitable procedures Suppliers 
   Failure to follow a defined procedure   
System Unintentional losses caused by: Technical failure through 
  Understand breakdown of technical system Fair wear and tear 
  Insufficient resilience in technical systems Design or poor implementation 
External Losses caused by: Natural events 
  Natural disasters Accidents 
  Man-made disasters unintentional Malicious third parties 
  Negligent actions of third parties Legitimate third parties whose  
  Legitimate actions of third parties business interests conflict  
    Table 7.2.3 SABSA Approach  
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7.2.4 Applying the SABSA Framework to Medical Devices in Hospitals  
 It is important that hospitals start using complex threat modeling frameworks in order 
to capture possible security threats. Below I have used the SABSA threat framework and 
have applied it to the hospital industry. Having a multidimensional framework will help 
mitigate the threats that will be associated with wireless medical devices and implantable 
medical devices. It will be important for hospitals to develop in-depth security 
countermeasures and policies before the legal system provides the motivation. There are 
already ads in legal journals looking for opportunities to sue hospitals due to the lack of 
security implemented on devices. The table 7.2.4 below applies the SABSA framework to 
hospitals with the goal of addressing security threats before they happen. Designing a clear 
picture of where the threats are coming from and what attribute it affects, allows for a more 
systemic deployment of security and the ability to trace mitigation strategies to the overall 
objectives of each department. Doing this level of organization, allows for security 
professionals to design and implement strategies that have the main objective of the 
organization in mind and will improve compliance with security rules.   
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Threat Domains and Threat Agents (SABSA) For Medical Device in Hospitals  
Threat 
Domain 
Description of Domain Threat agents 
People Losses caused by: Current employees 
  Violation of internal policies Past employees 
  Negligent internal policies Future Employees  
  Social Engineering  Software engineers  
  Virus Hackers  
  Loss of Security Information  Hospital Medical Staff  
  Software design  Sales Force 
  
Direct Attack Contractors  
  Human errors   
Processes Unintentional losses caused by: Employees 
  Deficiency in existing procedure Customers 
  Absence of suitable procedures Suppliers 
  Failure to follow a defined procedure Service providers 
  Government oversight is weak  Agents 
  Lack of education      Partners 
Technology Unintentional losses caused by: Technical failure through: 
  Understand breakdown of technical system Fair wear and tear 
  Insufficient resilience in technical systems Technical failure through inadequate 
  Backdoors designed for repair  design or poor implementation 
  Software has bad coding  out dated or not updated  
      
Environment Losses caused by: Natural events 
  Natural disasters Accidents 
  Man-made disasters unintentional Malicious third parties 
  Malicious actions of third parties Negligent third parties 
  Negligent actions of third parties Legitimate third parties whose  
  Legitimate actions of third parties business interests conflict 
  Organized attack on hospital structure  Terrorists  
      
   Table 7.2.4  Applied SABSA Hospitals  
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7.2.5 Vulnerability Assessment 
 The next major step in risk management is assessing the vulnerability of a device and 
the effects of a worst-case scenario. This becomes a very tricky objective, because it involves 
individual opinions of what is important. A good example of that is the lack of motivation to 
modify current implantable devices that have wireless security issues. Some of the device 
manufacturers have done a risk assessment and have decided that the risk is very low that an 
attack would take place on these specific devices. On the other hand, the client that has his or 
her life depending on the device that could potentially have security weaknesses would most 
likely rate the need to have the security issues repaired a lot higher.   
 Vulnerability assessment can be an extremely complicated part of risk management. 
A defined procedure that is well understood within the industry should be implemented to 
achieve the best success. In order to look more closely at the issues that the medical device 
industry faces we are first going to look at a vulnerability model that is designed from the 
SABSA risk assessment method.  
 The SABSA vulnerability assessment is designed for using with risk categories. 
Category A is colored red for severe risk. This means that immediate actions need to be taken 
to reduce the impact and vulnerability level. The colors are representative to the current 
stoplight to indicate levels of importance. The B category is yellow and represents a 
significant risk and appropriate actions should be taken to reduce risk. The C category is 
colored green and represents the vulnerability is low and should be monitored so that it is not 
upgraded to a level B. the final level is D using the color blue, meaning that no action is 
needed. The chart uses a simple quantitative scale to compare the vulnerability with the 
impact it would have on the business.  
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 When you look at table 7.2.5, it 
seems like an easy way to assess 
vulnerabilities with a device. The problem 
that arises is that companies take different 
ethical stands on what is an acceptable risk. 
Currently there are implemented implantable  
Table 7.2.5  Risk Assessment ( Sherwood 2005, p208) 
 
medical devices that have known security risks and would constitute a level B risk for the 
hospital and a level A for the client. It is clear that the device manufacturers do not see their 
risk in having a device with higher levels of security issues and what that means to the 
hospital system of objectives and goals.  Manufacturers of implantable medical devices rated 
the security issues in the C or D range because there are a limited number of devices on the 
market and the likelihood of an attack on one of those specific devices is low. That is 
understandable regarding pure technology and hardware implementation. It now becomes an 
ethical decision in a situation where human life is involved. Having a variance in acceptable 
risk and vulnerability within this industry will ultimately cause a collision between the 
various players that are involved with the device. A major legal problem arises when a 
company has analyzed their risk and labeled an A vulnerability as a level C; will the client 
H   – high-impact: could potentially do great damage to the business. 
M  – medium impact: could do significant damage to the business.  
L    – low impact: could only do minimal damage to the business. 
H   – High vulnerability: easily exploited by the threat. 
M  – medium vulnerability: possible for the threat to exploit. 
 L   – low vulnerability: very difficult to be exploited by the threat. 
(Sherwood 2005, p208)) 
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and his lawyer also label it a level C when the device fails due to a company known 
vulnerability? 
 Reducing the chance of a company underrepresenting a risk a device poses means 
there’s going to have to be a way of monitoring these types of risks and how a company 
labels them. It is very possible in the next 20 years for wireless medical devices to be 
commonplace within the human body.  Developing good frameworks to assess risk and 
sharing these risks within the industry is vital to developing a defense against the many 
different exploits that arise within our society. The SABSA model is a very comprehensive 
way of looking at those risks and organizing a comprehensive view of the evolving problems.   
 Once you understand the risk and the threats and how they relate to the organization, 
it is important to design a model to show who is responsible for oversight of each attribute.  
This is the person in the hospital that has the responsibility to report how objectives are being 
met. This also allows the hospital 
to start prioritizing what devices 
need the most security to meet 
the overall objectives set in the 
attributes.  In this situation, the 
CFO is the main person who 
accepts the risk for the attribute.  
The arrows represent the linkage 
between other departments and 
the objective of return of  
 Figure 7.2.5b Security Domains 
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investment. This is a simple example of how you can start the prioritization of devices in a 
hospital by using attributes.  For example a security professional needing some type of 
component to make a system auditable in the research department , will be able to 
communicate that the organization needs the device because it makes the CFO achieve his 
goal of auditable which then achieves the main goal of return of investment.  This is just one 
example of the possible outcomes that could exist using the method.  
  
7.2.6 Security Architecture Design for Implantable Medical Devices   
 Understanding the risk and threats to implantable medical devices is going to be 
extremely important as we advance our use of different types of devices. The reason for 
using a complicated architecture at the hospital level to secure devices is that a wide scale 
attack will most likely originate from the hospital or the devices that implantable medical 
devices interoperate with. Knowing how to correctly prioritize these devices, what 
vulnerabilities they have, and what security systems hospitals need will make the difference 
between successfully defending against attacks and being in a state of prevention.  Once you 
have defined the attributes and objectives and figured out what domains the attributes fall 
within, you can start looking at services the hospital provides and listing them in the correct 
domain.  
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   Figure 7.2.6 Traceability Domain and Components  
The final outcome of designing an architecture like this one, is that for the first time 
in most hospitals history there will be a traceability link between the components needed for 
security and the objectives of the hospital. By completing the processes the hospital 
organization will be able to understand what devices are most important for them to achieve 
their goals. Prioritization of the devices are based on the risk appetite of the organization and 
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the risk stakeholders rather than shooting in the dark at each device. An example of this 
might be a doctor’s laptop. The doctor will feel that his computer is extremely important for 
the organization’s success. When traced to an actual objective of the hospital it might fall 
well below the goals of the organization and the risk for that device failing might not be as 
important then a device that affects many individuals and causes the hospital to fail one of 
their main objectives. It becomes more important as many more devices become linked to the 
network in a hospital.  Furthermore, this becomes very important when trying to prioritize 
where the pacemaker systems fall within a hospital infrastructure.  The answer to that 
question, how do I secure a pacemaker? The answer is, depending on the goals and mission 
of the stakeholders of the hospital.  Pacemaker service might be considered extremely 
important to a major medical center or a hospital that specifically deals with heart patients.  
Additionally, a hospital that only has a few clients might position pacemaker security at a 
different level of risk to their stakeholder goals.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 Conclusion 
 
 Every day the medical device industry is advancing extremely fast due to the 
advancement of smaller and more powerful processors and with the advancement of wireless 
technology.  Incorporating this technology in to medical devices and the need for security is 
extremely important at this moment in history. Medical device manufacturers play an 
important role in developing devices that are safe, reliable and secure. This added 
responsibility is extremely important as we develop multiple devices with wireless 
technology and we develop medical devices that push the link between humans and 
computers. Building trust for these companies will involve their ability to provide devices 
that keep people safe and their information secure. The FDA has a major role in developing 
appropriate security measures for manufacturers to incorporate into the designs of their 
devices. The FDA does not need to provide legislation that will hinder development of 
medical devices, but they do need to provide structured guidelines on the acquisition of 
devices after use, the development of security measures for wireless devices, and device 
failure protocols. Setting up the environment to allow manufacturers to develop devices with 
security as a major focus is important for the future of medical devices. When we look back 
at 9/11, we ask ourselves why we didn’t see the warning signs of an impending attack. The 
warning signs for an impending attack on our medical infrastructure are there, if we look for 
them. The repercussions of a wide scale targeted attack or an unintended mistaken attack 
could be catastrophic for our medical system and general population if we wait to implement 
standards for security on medical devices. It is important that medical device manufacturers 
understand their role in the development of devices and the potential side effects of 
developing an insecure device. History has shown us that as a window of opportunity opens, 
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the amount of people providing solutions will increase. The legislation on developing 
medical devices could remain vague, which will lead to the development of devices by 
companies that may be insecure and have ethical issues. 
 In this battle for security between the hospitals and manufacturers, it is going to have 
to be the hospitals that step up and start providing guidelines for the manufacturers to follow. 
The hospitals are in a position where they have direct contact with every stakeholder in the 
circle of trust. The hospitals have the ability to financially afford advanced security teams 
and the ability to design infrastructure that keep patient data safe. This will be done through 
designing a clear and concise architecture that do not allow for medical devices to be placed 
with in the hospital environment without passing the hospital security standards. With the 
advanced structure of most hospitals, it is important that everybody in the hospital 
understands what is at risk if their network gets compromised and patient data is lost. A lot of 
securing hospitals comes down to appropriate policies and communication throughout the 
organization to understand what procedures need to be followed, when acquiring new 
technology. Currently, manufacturers are very good about infiltrating hospitals with their 
new technology to make a sale. In the past that has benefited the hospital and the client by 
providing up-to-date technology to improve medical care. The days of walking into the 
building with new technology and letting doctors experiment with it is becoming more and 
more difficult as these devices become more interconnected with the hospital networks. 
 Another major weakness that I witnessed in my interviews with hospital security 
managers and attending private hospital security meetings is that hospitals are in their own 
silos when it comes to security. While attending roundtable conversation on hospital network 
servers I noticed that out of seven different hospitals that were in the room, there wasn’t very 
80 
 
much in common between hospitals. Each hospital was implementing their own system and 
trying to figure out the security by themselves. Even between the same organizations, each 
building’s security professionals were tackling complicated network issues with different 
tools. This was partially because sales representatives were pushing different security tools 
and the security professionals were trying everything they could to stay ahead of every day 
technical issues. In order for hospitals to survive the advancement of wireless devices there is 
going to have to be some cooperation between hospital systems to develop methods. One of 
the hospitals that I talked with had over 50,000 devices on the network and a very small team 
to deal with them. With everybody in the same boat it surprises me that more hospitals are 
not working together to provide solutions. 
 The implantable pacemaker is an example of a device that has catastrophic effects if 
there was a major attack on its systems. It is important that hospitals build architectures to 
prioritize where these devices fit within their organization. These devices provide doctors 
with a wealth of information about the patient and are advancing every year. At the same 
time, the development of Bluetooth and cellular connections within pacemakers are actively 
being developed. There needs to be appropriate architecture structure and the ability to 
prioritize where these devices fit within the hospital. The time when security professionals 
could fix technical issues as they arise has disappeared and the need for a more systemic 
design is here. Hospitals need to be proactive in the development of security as a service to 
the clients. This might need to include a service charge to the individual like hospitals do for 
beds and sheets. We cannot afford to allow inadequate security on pacemakers and other 
medical devices, in our hospitals. The future of medical device advancement is at our 
fingertips. Can you imagine a world where hackers and government sponsored attacks can 
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affect the outcome and performance of implantable medical technology? People will be 
catching computer viruses and expensive medical procedures will need to be redone.  It is 
important that the foundation for secure medical devices is embraced so future systems can 
be developed with security built in and our society can trust the technology that will greatly 
enhance medical treatment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
REFERENCES: 
 
Akkaladevi, Somasheker, Himabindu Keesara, and Xin Luo. Efficient Forensic Tools for 
 Handheld Devices: A Comprehensive Perspective. PDF. 
 
Auerböck, Johanne, Maria Grunwald, and Ethan Russell. Medtronic MiniMed in the 
 Insulin Pump Industry: The Power of Complementary Assets and Reinforcing Loops. 
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 11 May 2005. PDF. 
 
Ayers, Rick, Wayne Jansen, Ludovic Moenner, and Aurelien Delaitre. Cell Phone 
 Forensic Tools: An Overview and Analysis Update. Rep. no. NISTIR 7387. National 
 Institute of Standards and Technology, Mar. 2007. Web. 
 
Beck, Hiroko, William E. Boden, Sushmitha Patibandla, Dmitriy Kireyev, Vipul Gupta, 
 Franklin Campagna, Michael E. Cain, and Joseph E. Marine. "50th Anniversary of 
 the First Successful Permanent Pacemaker Implantation in the United States: 
 Historical Review and Future Directions." American Journal of Cardiology (2010). 
 Apr. 2010. Web. 
 
Beekhof, Andrew. "Configuration Explained: An A-Z Guide to Pacemaker's 
 Configuration Options." Pacemaker Configuration Explained. ClusterLabs, 2011. 
 Web. <http://www.clusterlabs.org/doc/en-US/Pacemaker/1.1/html-
 single/Pacemaker_Explained/index.html>. 
 
Bellissimo, Anthony, John Burgess, and Kevin Fu. Secure Software 
 Updates:Disapointments and New Challenges. Vancouver, Canada: USENIX Hot 
 Topics in Security Workshop, July 2006. PDF. 
 
Breeuwsma, Marcel, Martien De Jongh, Coert Klaver, Ronald Van Der Knjiff, and Mark 
 Roeloffs. "Forensic Data Recovery from Flash Memory." Small Scale Digital Device 
 Forensics 1.1 (2007). Web. 
 <ssddfj.org/papers/SSDDFJ_V1_1_Breeuwsma_et_al.pdf>. 
Casey, Eoghan. "Chapter 20: Digital Evidence on Mobile Devices." Digital Evidence and 
 Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet. 3rd ed. Waltham, 
 MA: Academic, 2011. 1-44. Elsevier, 2011. Web. 
 
CDRH preliminary internal evaluations — volume I: Preliminary Report and 
 Recommendations, August 
 2010.http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHRepor
 ts/UCM220784. Pdf 
83 
 
 
Crosse, Marcia, and Gregory C. Wilshusen. FDA Should Expand Its Consideration of 
 Information Security for Certain Types of Devices. Rep. no. GAO-12-816. U.S. 
 Government Accountability Office, 31 Aug. 2012. Web. 
 <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-816>. 
 
Denning, Tamara, Alan Borning, Batya Friedman, Brian T. Gill, Tadayoshi Kohno, and 
 William H. Maisel. Patients, Pacemakers, and Implantable Defibrillators: Human 
 Values and Security for Wireless Implantable Medical Devices. ACM, 2010. PDF. 
 
Denning, Tamara, Kevin Fu, and Tadayoshi Kohno. Absence Makes the Heart Grow 
 Fonder: New Directions for Implantable Medical Device Security. 2008. PDF. 
 
Denning, Tamara, Yoky Matsuoka, and Tadayoshi Kohno. "Neurosecurity: Security and 
 Privacy for Neural Devices." Neurosurgical FOCUS 27.1 (2009): E7. July 2009. 
 Web. 
      Device Matters. U.S. Medical Device Innovation and the Role of Regulation - 
 Infographic http://www.devicematters.com/article/us-medical-device-innovation-and-
 role-regulation-infographic. Nov. 2013. Web.  
 
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm, June. 2012. Web 
 
FDA, Center for Devices and Radiological Health External defibrillator improvement 
 initiative. 
 http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Card
 iovascularDevices/ExternalDefibrillators/UCM233824.  Nov. 2011. pdf. 
 
Flack, Marilyn, Terrie Reed, Jay Crowley, and Susan Gardner.Identifying, 
 Understanding, and Communicating Medical Device Use Errors:  Observations from 
 an FDA Pilot Program. Advances In Patient Safety, Feb. 2005. PDF. 
 
Forbes, Lindell. Artificial Pacemakers. 16 Mar. 2007. PDF. 
 
 
Fu, Kevin. "Software Issues for the Medical Device Approval Process." Speech. The 
 Special Committee on Aging United States Senate Hearing. 13 Apr. 2011. Web. 
 
Fu, Kevin. Medical Devices: Security & Privacy Concerns. Amherst: University of 
 Massachusetts, 14 July 2011. PPT. 
 
GAO, Medical Devices, FDA Should Expand Its Consideration of Information Security 
 for Certain Types of Device, United Stated Government Accountability Office, 
 Report to Congressional Requesters,  August 2012. 
 
84 
 
Glithero, Bob. From Insider Abuse to Insider Accountability: Identity Analytics Discover 
 Insider Threats. Veriphyr, 2011. PDF. 
 
Gollakota, Shyamnath, Haitham Hassanieh, Benjamin Ransford, Dina Katabi, and Kevin 
 Fu. They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical 
 Devices. Toronto, Canada: ACM, Aug. 2011. PDF. 
 
Gruber, Ben. "First Wi-Fi Pacemaker in US Gives Patient Freedom." Reuters. Thomson 
 Reuters, 10 Aug. 2009. Web. 
 
Halperin, Daniel, Thomas Heydt-Benjamin, Benjamin Ransford, Shane Clark, Benessa 
 Defend, Will Morgan, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, and William Maisel. Pacemakers 
 and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power 
 Defenses. IEEE, 2008. PDF. 
 
Halperin, Daniel, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, and William 
 H. Maisel. "Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices." IEEE Pervasive 
 Computing 7.1 (2008): 30-39. Web. 
 
Hanna, Steven, Rolf Rolles, Andrés Molina-Markham, Pongsin Poosankam, Kevin Fu, 
 and Dawn Song. Take Two Software Updates and See Me in the Morning: The Case 
 for Software Security Evaluations of Medical Devices. San Francisco, CA: USENIX 
 Workshop on Health Security and Privacy, Aug. 2011. PDF. 
 
HIPAA Privacy Rule. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2003. 
 PDF. 
 
HIPAA, Breaches Affecting 500 or more Individuals, 2013-02-07 
 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachto
 ol.html 
 
Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board, “Letter to The Honorable Jeffrey 
 Zients, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget” (Washington, 
 D.C.: Mar. 30, 2012). The Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board Also, 
 DHS, Attack Surface: Healthcare and Public Health Sector, Bulletin 201205040900 
 (Washington, D.C.: May 2012). 
Israel, Steven A., John M. Irvine, Andrew Cheng, Mark Wiederhold, and Brenda 
 Wiederhold. "ECG to Identify Individuals." Pattern Recognition 38.1 (2005): 133-42. 
 Elsevier. Web. 
 
Jansen, Wayne, and Rick Ayers. Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics. Rep. no. 800-101. 
 National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 2007. Web. 
 
Jansen, Wayne, Aurelien Delaitre, and Ludovic Moenner. Overcoming Impediments to 
 Cell Phone Forensics. Tech. no. 1530-1605. National Institute of Standards and 
 Technology, 2008. Web. 
 
85 
 
Lee, Sinjin, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, Benjamin Ransford, and William H. Maisel. 
 "Clinically Significant Magnetic Interference of Implanted Cardiac Devices by 
 Portable Headphones." Heart Rhythm 6.10 (2009): 1432-436. Web. 
 
Li, Chunxiao, Anand Raghunathan, and Niraj K. Jha. Hijacking an Insulin Pump: 
 Security Attacks and Defenses for a Diabetes Therapy System. IEEE, 2011. PDF. 
 
Martin, Andrew. Mobile Device Forensics. Tech. SANS Institute, 29 Aug. 2009. Web. 
 
McDonald, James, Steven Dean, David Niewolny, Donnie Garcia, Navjot Chhabra, and 
 Lorris Chang. Integrated Circuits for Implantable Medical Devices. Freescale 
 Semiconductor, Inc., Aug. 2011. PPT. 
 
Meeting International Standards for Medical Device Reliability and Risk Management. 
 PTC.com. PDF. 
 
Müller, Axel, Thomas M. Helms, Hans-Jürgen Wildau, Jörg Otto Schwab, and Christian  
 Zugck. "Remote Monitoring in Patients with Pacemakers and Implantable 
 Cardioverter-Defibrillators: New Perspectives for Complex Therapeutic 
 Management." Modern Pacemakers - Present and Future. Ed. Mithilesh Kumar Das. 
 InTech, 2011. 147-66. InTech, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 
 <http://www.intechopen.com/books/modern-pacemakers- present-and-future/remote-
 monitoring-in-patients-with-pacemakers-and-implantable-cardioverter-defibrillators- 
 new-perspe>. 
 
Murphy, Cindy. Cellular Phone Evidence Data Extraction and Documentation. Tech. 
 July 2010. Web. http://www.ericjhuber.com/2010/07/detective-cindy-murphys-
 cell-phone.html 
 
Nordyke, Anne, and Greg Peterson. "A History of Diabetes and the Implantable Insulin 
 Pump." The Implantable Insulin Pump. 22 Apr. 2011. Web. 12 Nov. 2012. 
 <http://www.theiipump.com/index.php/a-timeline-of-diabetes-and-the-implantable-
 insulin-pump>. 
 
Nordyke, Anne, and Greg Peterson. The Developmental History of the Implantable 
 Insulin Pump. 2011. PDF. 
N. Paul et al., “A Review of the Security of Insulin Pump Infusion Systems,” Journal of 
 Diabetes Science and Technology,  
 
Patterson, Leigh-Ann M., Esq. HIPAA Law Alert. Nixon Peabody LLP, 06 Apr. 2003. 
 PDF. 
 
Petrochko, Cole. "DHC: EHR Data Target for Identity Thieves." MedPage Today. 07 
 Dec. 2011. Web. 
 
86 
 
Punja, Shafik G., and Richard P. Mislan. "Mobile Device Analysis." Small Scale Digital 
 Device Forensics 2.1 (2008). June 2008. Web. 
 <ssddfj.org/papers/SSDDFJ_V2_1_Punja_Mislan.pdf>. 
 
Ramabhadran, Anup. Forensic Investigation Process Model for Windows Mobile 
 Devices. Tata Elxsi. PDF. 
 
Roche Group. Media Relations. FDA Clears Accu-Chek Combo System - Roche’s New 
 Interactive Insulin Pump System for People With Diabetes. Roche. La Roche Ltd, 19 
 July 2012. Web. 12 Nov. 2012. 
 
Schultz, David. As Patients' Records Go Digital, Theft and Hacking Problems Grow. 
 Kaiser Health News, 03 June 2012. PDF. 
 
Shapiro, Jeffrey K., Hyman, Phelps, and McNamara. What Happens to Medical Device 
 Reports Once They Reach FDA? Regulatory Outlook, Jan. 2011. PDF. 
 
Sherwood, John and Clark, Andrew and Lynas David, Enterprise Security Architecture: 
 A Business-Driven Approach, November 12, 2005 | ISBN-10: 157820318X. Book. 
 
Singh, Yogendra N., and Phalguni Gupta. ECG to Individual Identification. IEEE, 2008. 
 PDF. 
 
Storm, Darlene.  Pacemaker hacker says worm could possibly 'commit mass murder'. 
 Oct. 17, 2012. PDF.  
 
The Cyber-Crime Black Market: Uncovered. Panda Security, 2010. PDF.  
 
United States. Department of Commerce. National Institute of Standards and 
 Technology. Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems 
 Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. By Gary 
 Stoneburner, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa. Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Dept. of 
 Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002. Web. 
 
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office for Civil Rights. 
 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Department of Health and Human Services, 
 2003. Web. 
 
 
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Health and Industry 
 Programs. Medical Device Use-Safety: Incorporating Human Factors Engineering 
 into Risk Management. By Ron Kaye and Jay Crowley. Center for Devices and 
 Radiological Health, 2000. Web. 
 
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. 
 Adverse Event Reporting for Medical Devices. By Daniel R. Levinson. Department of 
 Health and Human Services, 2009. Web. 
87 
 
 
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. 
 Scientific Disagreements Regarding Medical Device Regulatory Decisions. By Daniel 
 R. Levinson. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012. Web. 
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration." FDA Safety Communication: Cybersecurity for 
 Medical Devices and Hospital Networks. FDA, May-June 2013. Web. 13 Feb. 2014. 
 
Wang, Yongjin, Konstantinos N. Plataniotis, and Dimitrios Hatzinakos. Integrating 
 Analytic and Appearance Attributes for Human Identification from ECG Signals. 
 IEEE, 2006. PDF. 
 
White, Grady, Nikki Goldstein, Ward Johnson, Sudook Kim, and Chris Poling. "Medical 
 Device Reliability." Medical Device Reliability. National Institute of Standards and 
 Technology, 03 June 2010. Web. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
